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I. Introduction
Territorial rating, or "redlining," ' is the practice of setting automo-
bile liability insurance rates according to where a driver lives. Territorial
rating causes drivers who live on the wrong side of the actuarial tracks to
pay up to 100 percent more for automobile insurance. The financial im-
pact of territorial rating is graphically illustrated by this letter written to
Los Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn in 1984:
Dear Supervisor Hahn:
I recently read an article which you wrote in the local newspa-
per regarding the high cost of auto insurance in Los Angeles
County.... As you know most of the companies rate by zip code.2
A small group of residents and business places in North East
Torrance have an incorrect address and so we have to pay 40%
(almost double) for our auto insurance because the Post Office clas-
1. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
2. As far as the California Department of Insurance has ascertained, every insurer that
writes automobile liability insurance in California sets its rates by territory. CALIFORNIA DE-
PARTMENT OF INSURANCE, RATE REGULATION DIVISION, STUDY OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING
PERFORMANCE BY ZIP CODE (Phase 1), at 2 (1978) [hereinafter STUDY OF CALIFORNIA
DRIVING PERFORMANCE BY ZIP CODE].
TERRITORIAL RATING
sifies us as Gardena, 90248, which is a much higher rate than if we
had the correct address of Torrance, 90504. This is an area ap-
proximately five blocks long between Artesia Blvd. and 190th
Street on Western Avenue. It is the people on the west side of the
street on Western Avenue....
Sincerely yours,
Arlene Gorske3
Territorial rating produces unjust price disparities between neigh-
borhoods-often when they are literally next door to each other. The
financial consequences of these disparities fall most heavily on the racial
minorities and poor who inhabit the inner cities of California.' This is
graphically illustrated by Ms. Gorske's letter. Zip code 90504 covers
part of Torrance, a predominantly white area of Southern California with
a total minority population of 40 percent.6 In contrast, Gardena, the city
located in zip code 90248, had a population that was 90 percent minority
in 1990.7
Territorial rating as practiced in California violates a basic tenet of
equal protection jurisprudence: that "burdens [imposed] should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."' Territo-
rial rating imposes a substantial economic burden on drivers who choose
to, or must, live in low income, predominantly minority, communities.
The system has led to an inherently unfair economic result: those resi-
dents of urban areas of California with the lowest median income levels
are charged the highest rates in the state for automobile insurance.9
While there may be some statistical support for these pricing dispari-
ties,10 it is indisputable that the burdens imposed on the poor and racial
minorities by territorial rating bear no relationship to individual
responsibility. I I
Part I of this Article documents the disparate economic impact of
territorial rating on African-Americans, Latinos, and the poor in Califor-
3. Data collected by the California Department of Insurance in 1986 reveal that Ms.
Gorske's description of the financial consequences of territorial rating on her life was accurate.
The average insurance rate for zip code 90248 was $548.67. For zip code 90504, the average
rate was dramatically lower: $358.67. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, CON-
SUMER AFFAIRS DIVISION, COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
FOR CALIFORNIA (1986) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY].
4. See id. and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.
6. WESTERN ECONOMIC RESEARCH Co., UPDATED RACE AND ETHNIC ESTIMATES BY
ZIP CODE 6 (1990).
7. Id at 4.
8. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part 1ID.
11. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
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nia. Part II chronicles the history of the debate and litigation regarding
territorial rating, describes the current state of California law on the sub-
ject, and outlines the statutes that govern the issue. Part III argues that
state approval of territorial rating would violate the California Constitu-
tion. Part IV uses an analytical system developed by Professor Leah
Wortham to reconcile the insurance industry's need to group risks with
the mandates of Proposition 10312 and the California Constitution.
I. The Disparate Impact of Territorial Rating on People of
Color and the Poor
A. The Distribution of Insurance Rates in Los Angeles and the San
Francisco Bay Area
In 1986, the California Department of Insurance published a com-
prehensive study of the financial consequences of territorial rating. That
study, entitled "Comparative Premium Survey of Automobile Insurance
for California," 13 examined liability insurance rates for automobiles us-
ing a standard policy type and automobile model. 4 The Comparative
Premium Survey lists the rates charged by ten major insurers for every
county in California, for every zip code in the state.
The Comparative Premium Survey documents the distribution of au-
tomobile insurance rates. Comparison of the data from the Comparative
Premium Survey with demographic and economic data compiled by the
Census Bureau and other organizations 15 documents the racial and eco-
nomic impact of that distribution. This comparison reveals that almost
12. Proposition 103 is an initiative measure enacted by California voters in November
1988. It substantially revised the California Insurance Code. See infra notes 151-55 and ac-
companying text.
13. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
14. To conduct the study, the department created a standard driver. That theoretical
driver was between the ages of 35 and 55 and married to a spouse of the same age. Both
spouses were licensed for over five years, with no citations and no accidents. The standard
automobile was a 1981 Buick Century. Policy limits were standardized as much as possible.
The department then collected data from each insurer surveyed about the rate(s) that
would be charged for such a driver in each zip code area of the state. The average rate figures
used throughout this Article are a composite of the rates charged by three major insurers
doing business in the areas of the state discussed. The Southern California rates are a compos-
ite of the rates charged by State Farm, Farmers, and Allstate. For Northern California, the
averages represent the rates charged by State Farm, Farmers, and either GEICO (Government
Employees Insurance Company) or Allstate. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
15. The census data used throughout this Article are drawn from the publication, UP-
DATED RACE AND ETHNIC ESTIMATES BY ZiP CODE, supra note 6. The introduction to this
publication explains that the data are an updated version of the statistics from the 1980 census.
The updated data are created using a combination of census data, proprietary files, and Census
Bureau state and county population estimates.
Snrintr 19921 TRIOILRTN
invariably, 6 residents of areas of the Los Angeles Basin and San Fran-
cisco Bay Area that are identifiably African-American, Latino, Asian,
and/or poor pay the highest rates for automobile insurance in
California.17
L The Racial Impact of Territorial Rating.
A hypothetical driver living in zip code 90220 in Compton paid an
average premium of $791.25 for liability insurance in 1986.18 If that same
driver could afford to, or chose to live in zip code 90501 in Torrance, or
zip code 90277 in Redondo Beach, predominantly Anglo communities
located just 10 miles away from Compton, the driver would have paid an
average premium of $345.50.19 The racial impact of this price disparity
is clear. The minority population of Compton, as of 1990, was 109%.2
0
People of color comprise 47% of the populace of the area of Torrance
covered by zip code 90501,21 while they make up only 16% of the popu-
lation of Redondo Beach.22
16. Those metropolitan areas with the lowest aggregate income levels were the highest
rated territories in the Los Angeles Basin and the San Francisco Bay Area. The notable excep-
tion is the highest rated territory in California-Beverly Hills. In the Comparative Premium
Survey, the average rate in zip codes 90211 and 90212, both located in Beverly Hills, was
$995.00. This result makes economic sense, given that those zip code areas in Beverly Hills
have very high income levels. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
17. This result is not limited to California. A study done by the New Jersey Department
of Insurance found that base rates there varied inversely with the gross income of the territory.
While the report concluded that a case for a pattern of racial discrimination had not been
made out, it acknowledged "the possibility of territorial boundaries doing the work of suspect
or unlawful criteria .... " NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, HEARING ON AUTO-
MOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES: FINAL DETERMI-
NATION-MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, at 45 (1981).
18. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
19. Id.




UPDATED RACE AND ETHNIC ESTIMATES BY ZIP CODE, supra note 6, at 4.
The numbers add up to more than 100% because of overlaps between Asian, Black, and
Hispanic residents. The introduction to UPDATED RACE AND ETHNIC ESTIMATES BY ZIP
CODE 1990 explains the reason for the statistical result: "[b]y a census definition, persons of a
Hispanic origin can be of any race."





22. The minority population statistics for Redondo Beach, zip code 90277, in 1990 were:
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Similar rate disparities affect Inglewood, another predominantly
Black and Latino area of Los Angeles County. The Insurance Depart-
ment Study's hypothetical driver, living in Inglewood, would have paid
an average premium of $703.00.23 If that driver moved to El Segundo or
Manhattan Beach, predominantly Anglo communities located adjacent
to Inglewood, the driver's average premium cost would plunge to
$345.00.24 Again, the racial impact of the disparity in rates is indisputa-
ble. Inglewood's population was 102% people of color.25 Racial minori-
ties made up a mere 11% of the population of El Segundo in 1990"6 and
they comprised 10% of the population of Manhattan Beach in 1990.27
A similar pattern of distribution of significant insurance rate dispari-
ties exists in the San Francisco Bay Area. The Comparative Premium
Survey shows that the hypothetical driver residing in Oakland in 1986
paid an average liability premium of $409.00.28 If that same driver
moved to Alameda, a community located just across a bridge from Oak-
land, the driver's average premium cost would have dropped to $235.67
for the same coverage.29 The contrast in the racial data for these com-





23. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
24. Id





UPDATED RACE AND ETHNIC ESTIMATES BY ZIP CODE, supra note 6, at 5.










28. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3. This figure represents the average of
rates charged by Allstate, Farmers, and State Farm. The COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY




Oakland in 1990 was 96% minority.3" The racial make up of Alameda,
zip code 94501, was only 33% minority.3"
The city of Berkeley, California, presents a telling case study of the
correlation between insurance rate disparity and racial composition. Zip
codes 94702 and 94710 had the highest rates in Berkeley-the Insurance
Department's hypothetical driver paying an average rate of $409.00.32
Move into zip codes 94705 or 94708 in Berkeley, and the average rate
dropped to $240.00.13  The minority populace of zip code 94702 in
Berkeley in 1990 was 69%,14 and 77% for zip code 94710.1' The figures
for zip code 94705 in 1990 show a minority population of 23%,36 while
minorities comprised only 16% of the population of zip code 94708. 37




UPDATED RACE AND ETHNIC ESTIMATES BY ZIP CODE, supra note 6, at 55.





32. This average was paid for coverage with Allstate, State Farm, and Farmers Insurance.
COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
33. The rates quoted are attributed to Allstate and State Farm respectively. Farmers' rate
is not included because it is listed as having a "split rate, with no price quoted," for these zip
code areas. It




UPDATED RACE AND ETHNIC ESTIMATES BY ZIP CODES, supra note 6, at 56.
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The Comparative Premium Survey examined rates in 1986. A more
recent study conducted by the Department of Insurance confirmed that
insurers continue to charge the highest automobile insurance rates to
neighborhoods in Los Angeles County that are identifiably African-
American or Latino. a" The lowest rated areas in California are rural
communities where the presence of African-Americans and Asians is
negligible, which enhances the discriminatory effect of territorial
rating.
39
2. The Future Racial Impact of Territorial Rating
Territorial rating will continue to adversely affect people of color,
due to the persistent nature of segregated housing in the United States.
In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal, in his landmark study of African-Americans,
noted that housing segregation was a major problem in the North and
the South.' Myrdal identified four primary factors that led to residen-
tial segregation: the poverty of African-Americans, which consigned
them to the cheapest housing accommodations; ethnic attachment;41 seg-
regation enforced by white people; and segregation enforced by the poll-
38. A second study of territorial pricing conducted by the California Department of In-
surance was published in June 1990. The AUTOMOBILE PREMIUM SURVEY 1990 surveyed the
rates charged in different Southern California communities by various insurers. Although not
as comprehensive as the 1986 survey, the 1990 study does demonstrate that the pricing pattern
identified in 1986 continues today. The AUTOMOBILE PREMIUM SURVEY shows that a driver
living in zip code 90220 in Compton, age 35, carrying a liability-only policy, paid an average
premium price of $701.00. That same driver, moving to zip code 90504 in Torrance, would
immediately lower his or her premium to $463.00.
39. Justice Broussard suggested in a concurring opinion that the economic and racial im-
pact of these price disparities becomes even more pronounced as you leave the inner city and
move to the suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas. King v. Meese, 743 P.2d 889, 902 n.8 (Cal.
1987) (Broussard, J., concurring).
40. Myrdal concluded that housing segregation was more important in the North than in
the South, however, since the South had laws enforcing racial separation while the North had
practically no such laws. 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROB-
LEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 618 (Pantheon Books 1972) (1944).
41. Myrdal uses the term "ethnic attachment" to describe the tendency of immigrant
groups to cluster together in colonies in the poorer sections of northern cities. He states that
all national groups of immigrants, for reasons of economy and ethnic cohesion, formed such
colonies upon arrival. Id. at 620. For Myrdal, African-Americans who migrated North were
an immigrant group that followed this pattern. He concluded that African-Americans formed
immigrant "colonies" for convenience and mutual protection. Id. at 619.
Myrdal documented one overriding difference between European immigrants and Afri-
can-American immigrants. For the European immigrant groups, the colonies were not perma-
nent-they dissipated as the immigrants became assimilated and more prosperous. For
African-Americans, however, the colonies became permanent, due to economic, educational,
and social obstacles, and housing segregation. In Myrdal's own words, "'they [African-Ameri-
cans] are kept as aliens permanently." Id. at 620.
852
cies of the federal government, particularly the FHA.42  Myrdal
documented white citizens and the federal government enforcing housing
segregation by using restrictive covenants, which prohibited the sale of
properties in "white areas" to African-Americans and other minorities.43
Private citizens and groups supplemented the restrictive covenants by
resorting to extra legal activities ranging from "persuasion" to bombings
to discourage African-Americans from moving into "white"
neighborhoods.'
Myrdal predicted that if the courts declared restrictive covenants
illegal, housing segregation, at least in the North, "would be nearly
doomed. '45 Unfortunately, Myrdal's prediction has not come to frui-
tion. In 1948, the United States Supreme Court declared that enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Yet
housing segregation remains a persistent fact of American life.
In 1968, the Kerner Commission was appointed by President Lyn-
don Johnson to study the causes of the race riots then afflicting the coun-
try. The commission identified housing segregation as one major cause
of racial unrest.47 The Kerner Commission concluded that most black
families remained in predominantly black neighborhoods because they
were effectively excluded from white residential areas.48 Citing a 1965
study of racial housing patterns, the commission noted that the patterns
observed in 1944 by Myrdal continued unabated, with a high degree of
racial separation present in virtually all American cities.49
The commission cited three factors that contributed to the persis-
tence of housing segregation after the elimination of restrictive cove-
nants: threats of violence and actual violence against African-Americans
who attempted to move into all-white neighborhoods; real estate agents'
refusals to show homes in those areas to African-American customers;
and the refusal of whites to move into predominantly black areas.5 0
42. Id at 348-49, 619.
43. Id. at 624. In the case of the federal government, Myrdal noted that the FHA in-
structed lenders and developers operating under its programs to prevent the "infiltration of
.. inharmonious racial groups." In addition, he noted that the FHA advised its property
valuators that "effective restrictive covenants.., provide the surest protection against undesir-
able encroachment ... ." Id. at 349.
44. Id at 624.
45. Id.
46. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
47. ANGUS CAMPBELL & HOWARD SCHUMAN, SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NA-
TIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 91 (1968).
48. Id. at 119.
49. Id. at 120-121. The commission relied on a statistical study of residential segregation.
KARL AND ALMA TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CrES (1965).
50. CAMPBELL & SCHUMAN, supra note 47, at 120-21.
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In 1989 the National Research Council issued a new study of race
relations in the United States.5 This study documents the present day
persistence of residential segregation. The study concluded that whites
hold three attitudes that help to explain the persistence of segregated
housing. First, they believe that stable interracial neighborhoods are
rare; once a few African-Americans move in, the neighborhood is bound
to become predominantly black. Second, whites believe that property
values will be lowered by the presence of blacks. Third, whites believe
that crime rates are higher in black neighborhoods. As a result of these
attitudes, 25% of white people surveyed in one study indicated that they
would be uncomfortable if blacks composed 7% of the population in an
area, while 40% said they would be uncomfortable if 20% of the neigh-
borhood was composed of black residents.52
Two social scientists, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, recently
published a detailed study of segregated housing patterns in major cities
in the United States. Denton and Massey coined the term "hypersegre-
gation" to connote the fact that the isolation of African-Americans in
identifiable racial enclaves within large urban centers of the United States
is actually increasing.53 Denton and Massey, using five categories or
dimensions to define segregation, concluded that Los Angeles is one of
the most segregated urban areas in the nation for both African-Ameri-
cans and Hispanics.5
4
3. The Economic Impact of Territorial Rating.
Comparison of the automobile liability rates documented in the
Comparative Premium Survey with economic data compiled by the Cen-
sus Bureau and other organizations 55 demonstrates that territorial rating
also has an adverse impact upon the urban poor.
Consider the areas compared in the discussion of the racial impact
of redlining. The median household income in Compton, zip code 90220,
was $26,224.00 in 1990.56 Compton residents paid an average premium
51. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY (1989).
52. Id. at 141.
53. Douglas Massey & Nancy Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas:
Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373 (1989).
54. Id. at 377, 384. The San Francisco Bay Area was classified as moderately segregated
for African-Americans. Id. at 377-78.
55. The median income data used in this article are drawn from WESTERN ECONOMIC
RESEARCH, Co., ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES BY ZIP CODES (1991), which contains
income estimates for the year 1990.
56. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 4.
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of $791.25 for liability insurance.5 7 The median income in Torrance, zip
code 90501, was $31,448.00,58 while the median income in Redondo
Beach, zip code 90277, was $42,427.00. 59 The average liability insurance
premium charged in those communities was $345.00, 0 less than one half
the rate charged in Compton.
For Inglewood, zip code 90301, the average premium was $745.00.61
The median income for that community was $25,720.00.62 In nearby El
Segundo, zip code 90245, the median household income was
$41,763.00,63 while the median income in Manhattan Beach, zip code
90266, was $58,403.00. 64 Both communities paid an average liability in-
surance premium of $345.00,65 less than half the rate paid by Inglewood
residents.
The inverse relationship between income and automobile liability in-
surance premium rates exists in urban Northern California as well. In a
representative Oakland neighborhood, zip code 94601, the average liabil-
ity premium was $409.00.66 The median household 4ncome in that com-
munity was $21,681.00.67 In Alameda, zip code 94501, the community
across the bridge from Oakland, the average liability rate dropped to
$235.676" while the median household income rose to $33,927.00.69
The residents of the highest rated territories in Berkeley, zip codes
94702 and 94710, paid an average premium of $409.00.70 Those commu-
nities had median incomes of $23,014.00 and $20,606.00 respectively.
71
Residents of the lowest rated territories in Berkeley, zip codes 94705 and
94708, paid $240.00 for the same coverage.72 The median incomes in
those areas were $37,742.00 and $66,528.00 respectively.73
The inverse relation between automobile liability insurance rates
and wealth is more pronounced than the preceding comparisons suggest.
57. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra, note 3.
58. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 6.
59. Id. at 5.
60. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
61. Id.
62. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 5.
63. I at 4.
64. Id at 5.
65. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
66. Id
67. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 55.
68. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
69. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 54.
70. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
71. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 56.
72. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
73. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 56.
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Significantly lower automobile liability insurance rates are charged in
some of the wealthiest communities in urban California. In Southern
California, the median household income was $65,646.00 in zip code
91105, a neighborhood in Pasadena.' The average liability insurance
rate charged in that community was $358.00. 7" In Palos Verdes, zip code
90274, where the median household income was $75,000.01,76 the aver-
age liability rate charged was $358.67. 77 And in Playa Del Rey, zip code
90292, where the median household income was $56,567.00,71 the aver-
age automobile liability insurance rate was $372.33.79
In Northern California, even lower prices prevailed in some of that
region's wealthiest communities. In Fremont, a community located south
of Oakland, the median household income in zip code 94539 was
$56,344.00 in 1990.80 The average automobile liability insurance rate
charged in that community was $230.66.81 In San Francisco, the average
liability rate charged in zip code 94127 was a mere $286.00,12 while the
median income was $60,737.00.3 And in zip code area 94707 in Berke-
ley, the average liability insurance rate was $269.33.84 The residents of
that community had a median income of $60,000.00.11
4. The Future Economic Impact of Territorial Rating.
These comparisons illustrate the inverse correlation between the
wealth of neighborhoods and the liability insurance rates charged in ur-
ban California communities. The persistence of housing segregation, cou-
74. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 10.
75. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
76. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ErSMATES, supra note 55, at 5.
77. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
78. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 5.
79. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
80. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 53.
81. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
82. Id.
83. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 48.
84. COMPARATIVE PREMIUM SURVEY, supra note 3.
85. ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES, supra note 55, at 56. The information presented
here is anecdotal. An insurance rating study conducted by the Stanford Research Institute
(SRI) and funded by the insurance industry, however, acknowledged the existence of an in-
verse relationship between wealth and rates. The SRI study examined the relationship of
wealth and rates in Illinois using data supplied by Allstate Insurance Company. The research-
ers discovered that disposable income is the highest on the average in medium rated territories,
and drops significantly for the lowest rated territories (rural areas) and the highest rated territo-
ries (inner city areas). BARBARA CASEY, JACQUES PEZIER, AND CARL SPETZLER, THE ROLE
OF RISK CLASSIFICATIONS IN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE: A STUDY OF THE
RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS (1976), at 97 (emphasis added). The SRI study, while bemoaning
the lack of data available on the relationship of income to premiums, concluded that the
available data "seem to suggest ... a negative correlation." Id. at 96.
pled with the economic conditions that afflict people of color, guarantee
that the burdens of territorial rating will always fall most heavily on the
urban poor of California.
Housing segregation guarantees that most African-Americans will
continue to live in areas of the state predominantly populated by
blacks. 6 It is no surprise that these areas have significantly lower median
income levels, since poverty and race have always been closely inter-
twined. In 1944, Gunnar Myrdal identified two causes of this
relationship:
Nonagricultural Negro workers are, for the most part, either in
low paid service occupations or have menial tasks in industry. Few
are skilled workers.... The majority of manufacturing industries
do not give jobs to Negroes. Neither in the South nor in the North
are Negroes in professional, business or clerical positions, except in
rare instances and except when serving exclusively the Negro pub-
lic. . . . The unemployment risk of Negroes is extraordinarily
high.87
The concentration of African-Americans in low paid occupations
and the unemployment lines has been a consistent characteristic of
American society. The Kerner Commission concluded that the economic
inequality identified by Myrdal in 1944 was extant in 1968.88 The com-
mission cited three factors responsible for the dismal economic status of
African-Americans. Two of those factors were the problems identified by
Myrdal-high unemployment89 and the continued concentration of
working African-Americans in the lowest levels of employment. 90 In ad-
86. See supra notes 40-54, and accompanying text.
87. MYRDAL, supra note 40, at 206. The high rate of unemployment risk was not surpris-
ing. Myrdal noted that economic progress generally worked against the economic interests of
African-Americans:
When modem techniques transform old handicrafts into machine production, Ne-
groes lose jobs in the former but usually do not get into the new factories, at least not
at the machines.... When work becomes less heavy, less dirty, or less risky, Ne-
groes are displaced.
88. CAMPBELL AND SCHUMAN, supra note 47, at 91-92. The commission cited economic
deprivation as a prime cause of the racial unrest then buffeting the nation. Id.
89. The Kerner Commission noted that even in a good economic climate, the rate of
African-American unemployment was double the rate of white unemployment in every cate-
gory. Id.
90. The Commission observed that:
Negro workers are concentrated in the lowest skilled and lowest paying occupations.
Those jobs often involve substandard wages, great instability and uncertainty of ten-
ure, extremely low status in the eyes of both employer and employee, little or no
chance for meaningful advancement, and unpleasant or exhausting duties. Negro
men in particular are more than three times as likely as whites to be in unskilled or
service jobs which pay far less than most[.]
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dition to these impediments, the Kerner Commission identified a third
factor responsible for the poor economic standing of African-Ameri-
cans-chronic underemployment."
While some African-Americans made significant educational and
economic progress during the sixties, seventies, and eighties, most blacks
remain trapped in the conditions described by Myrdal and the Kerner
Commission.9 2 This is how one author described the situation in 1987:
a racial division of labor has been created due to decades, even
centuries, of discrimination and prejudice .... [B]ecause those in
the low wage sector of the economy are more adversely affected by
impersonal shifts in advanced industrial society, the racial division
of labor is reinforced .... [B]lacks have been severely hurt by
deindustrialization because of their heavy concentration in the au-
tomobile, rubber, steel and other smokestack industries.93
The coalescence of economic deprivation and housing segregation
has created a self perpetuating cycle of poverty for poor African-Ameri-
cans. In 1944, Myrdal theorized that poverty breeds the conditions that
perpetuate poverty. He then observed that it is more difficult for African-
Americans to escape this cycle of poverty because "in the case of Ne-
groes, the deprecation (of poverty) is fortified by the elaborate system of
racial beliefs .... ,9
Forty-five years later, the authors of A Common Destiny described
the present operation of that cycle for African-Americans:
[P]oor blacks, to a much greater degree than poor whites, interact
mainly with other disadvantaged people. Black poor children at-
tend schools with other poor children, go to churches with impov-
Id. at 124.
91. Even among those' urban African-Americans who were working, the Commission
found that a high proportion were "underemployed." "Underemployed" was defined to in-
clude part-time workers who were seeking full-time employment, full-time workers earning
less than $3,000 per year, and those who had dropped out of the labor force. The Labor
Department estimated that the rate of "underemployment" was 2.5 times the rate of unem-
ployment in urban ghettoes. Id. at 126.
92. DOUGLAS GLASGOW, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS 5-6 (Vintage Books edition 1981)
(1980). The National Research Council noted that black men with some college education
earned 80-85% as much as their white counterparts. On the other end of the scale, black men
who did not finish high school were victims of the stagnant economy of the seventies. Many of
these men have dropped out of the labor force. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 51, at 275.
93. WILLIAM WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDER-
CLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (1987). Statistical studies conducted by the National Research
Council for its 1990 report confirm Wilson's observation. Analysis of employment data re-
vealed that disproportionate numbers of African-Americans are employed in low wage jobs.
The council concluded that workers holding such jobs remain more vulnerable to periods of
temporary or permanent unemployment. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 51, at 283, 294,
296.
94. MYRDAL, supra note 40, at 208-209.
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erished congregations, and deal with merchants geared to do
business with a poor clientele. Racial segregation in residence rein-
forces the effects of economic separation.95
While some African-Americans have escaped this cycle of failure,96
the majority have not. Those who remain are trapped in inner-city neigh-
borhoods9 7 where territorial rating allows insurers to charge the highest
rates in the state.98 Since the concentration of African-Americans in en-
claves of poverty in California is increasing,9 9 territorial rating will con-
tinue to impose the highest automobile insurance rates upon the state's
poorest urban residents."°
95. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 51, at 283-84 (emphasis added).
96. The result of this confluence of poverty and segregation was deftly summarized by the
Kerner Commission in 1967:
For residents of disadvantaged Negro neighborhoods, obtaining good jobs is vastly
more difficult than for most workers in society. For decades, social, economic, and
psychological disadvantages surrounding the urban Negro poor have impaired their
work capacities and opportunities. The result is a cycle of failure-the unemploy-
ment disabilities of one generation breed those of the next.
CAMPBELL & SCHUMAN, supra note 47, at 124.
Even those African-Americans who have "escaped" from this cycle of failure have not
achieved economic equality. In 1978 the Kerner Commission found that, given similar em-
ployment, African-American workers with the same level of education earned less than white
workers. Id at 126. Although the degree of separation has since narrowed for college-educated
African-Americans, college-educated Black males still earn only 85% as much as their white
counterparts. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 51, at 275.
97. The National Research Council concluded that poor blacks are more likely than poor
whites to live in central cities and in neighborhoods where a high proportion of residents are
poor. A COMMON DESTINY, supra note 51, at 283.
98. See supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
100. Similar conditions affect the Latino population in California. While the connection
between race and poverty is not as strong for Hispanics and Latinos, there is in fact a connec-
tion. Like African-Americans, California Latinos are concentrated in jobs at the low end of the
economic scale. LOUIE WOOLBRIGHT AND DAVID HARTMANN, THE NEW SEGREGATION:
ASIANS AND HISPANICS, IN DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS 146 (Gary Tobin ed., 1987); Roberto
Suro, Without A Ladder: The Mexican Immigrants, NEw YORK TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, section
1, at I (part 1). As a result, California Latinos, like African-Americans, are more vulnerable to
the economic shift from manufacturing jobs to lower paying service industry jobs which is
occurring in the United States. Id, John Hendren and Louise Palmer, 1 Million Latino Chil-
dren Entered Poverty in the 1980s, Study Says, STATES NEWS SERVICE, August 27, 1991,
available in Lexis, Nexis Library. Given the higher unemployment and lower wage levels
which have resulted from that shift, the median income level among Mexican-Americans actu-
ally decreased during the eighties. In Los Angeles, 16.7% of Mexican-American families lived
below the poverty level in 1969. In 1990, 28% were living below that line. Gloria Romero,
Perspective on the Chicano Uprising, Los ANGELES TIMES, August 31, 1990, at B7.
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B. The Contribution of Financial Responsibility Laws to the Problems
Caused by Redlining
The racial and financial impact of the territorial rating system is
aggravated by the continuing trend in the states toward enactment of
financial responsibility laws.' California drivers are legally required to
carry some form of automobile liability insurance. Because of this re-
quirement, the contention that drivers who do not like, or cannot afford,
the high premiums charged in inner cities can and should opt out of the
insurance system, is becoming moot.
0 2
California's financial responsibility laws require virtually all drivers
to carry liability insurance. California Vehicle Code section 16020 re-
quires every driver to maintain in force some form of financial responsi-
bility and to carry evidence of the form of that financial responsibility in
the automobile. Vehicle Code section 16021 defines three forms of finan-
cial responsibility: a certificate of self-insurance, purchase of automobile
liability insurance or a bond, or a deposit of $50,000 with the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles. The "alternatives" to the purchase of automo-
bile liability insurance are illusory. Vehicle Code section 16053, which
mentions the certificate of self-insurance, applies to fleet owners operat-
ing more than twenty-five vehicles. It is patently obvious that a person
who cannot afford to pay the several hundred dollars required for mini-
mum liability insurance will not be able to deposit the aggregate amount
of $50,000 with the Department of Motor Vehicles that section
16054.2(a) requires.1
3
The state enforces these financial responsibility laws through an ac-
cident reporting requirement. Any time a driver is involved in an auto-
mobile accident, he or she must provide proof of financial responsibility.
If the driver fails to produce the required proof, his or her driver's license
may be suspended."°
101. As of 1979, 25 states had some form of financial responsibility law. U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS IN STATE REGULATION OF THE
INSURANCE BUSINESS 75 (1979). In 1982, that number rose to 32. Compulsory Auto Insur-
ance: How Well Does It Work?, 1982 J. OF AM. INS. at 20. By 1990, 41 states had some form
of mandatory liability insurance law. Clifford Meacham & Wayne Andersen, Illinois'
Mandatory Insurance Law, 78 ILL. B.J. 298 (1990).
102. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Risk in Insurance Risk Classification,
71 VA. L. REV. 403, 407 (1985).
103. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16021(d), 16054.2 (a), 16056, 16435.
104. Id. §§ 16000, 16000.1, 16070, 16430. The Legislature, dissatisfied with the efficacy of
the accident reporting requirement, added a new enforcement mechanism in 1985. Vehicle
Code § 16028 allowed any peace officer to demand proof of financial responsibility whenever a
ticket was issued in connection with a moving violation. If the driver failed to produce proof
of financial responsibility, she or he committed an infraction. If the driver in fact was not
insured or otherwise financially responsible, she or he was subject to a substantial fine, and had
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The existence of California's financial responsibility laws means that
the purchase of liability insurance is not optional--each lerson who
drives in California must carry liability insurance or risk losing the driv-
ing privilege (unless the person is extremely wealthy). The fact that driv-
ers cannot legally opt out of the system, coupled with the fact that all
insurers in California utilize territorial rating,"0 5 means that drivers liv-
ing in redlined territories must pay the high rates charged in their com-
munities or risk losing their driving privileges.
U. Historical and Statutory Background
The practice of territorial rating has been the subject of intense
political and legal debate in California for over twenty years. In this de-
bate, the opponents of territorial rating have defined the practice as "red-
lining." A group of advisory committees to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights has defined insurance redlining as "cancel-
ling, refusing to insure or to renew, or varying the terms under which
insurance is available to individuals because of the geographic location of
a risk."'
106
Territorial rating, as practiced by the insurance industry in Califor-
nia, clearly fits the definition of redlining. Insurers refuse to insure resi-
dents in low-income and predominantly minority areas of the state. 10 7
When insurers do agree to cover drivers in those areas, they vary greatly
to obtain insurance or otherwise prove financial responsibility within 60 days or his or her
driver's license was suspended. The measure expired on December 30, 1990. So far, legislative
efforts to revive the law have failed. S.B. 228, 1991-92 Regular Session (1991); A.B. 2078,
1991-92 Regular Session (1991).
105. See supra note 2.
106. ILLINOIS, INDIANA, MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA, OHIO AND WISCONSIN ADVISORY
COMMITTES TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INSURANCE REDLIN-
ING: FACT, NOT FICTION 4 (1979).
Similar definitions have been developed in the home mortgage business. In that context,
the term "redline" has been defined as: "To discriminate against economically, especially by
refusing to grant mortgages or by charging [an] unreasonably high mortgage." FUNK AND
WAGNALL'S NEW COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (1982). In Conference of Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th
Cir. 1979), the court defined redlining as "credit discrimination based upon the characteristics
of the neighborhood surrounding the borrower's dwelling."
107. On May 15, 1991, the Insurance Commissioner of California issued proposed regula-
tions to encourage insurers to serve "disadvantaged communities." The proposed regulations
were preceded by findings that:
1) Insurance is more difficult to obtain in minority and low income and inner
city communities in the State of California; and
2) that the difficulty in obtaining insurance in these communities is the result of
insurers ignoring the needs of those communities, discouraging their personnel from
serving those communities, withholding and canceling agency appointments in those
communities, and failing to hire employees from those communities.
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the terms under which automobile insurance may be purchased in those
areas, by charging as much as 100 percent more than is charged in neigh-
boring communities. 108
A. The Legislative Debate
Since 1973, the California legislature has considered numerous bills
designed to modify or forbid the practice of territorial rating. 109 The Leg-
islature has also held several hearings on the subject."' In 1978 the As-
sembly directed the Insurance Commissioner to study the issue of
territorial rating."' During that same year, the Legislature added to In-
surance Code section 11628 the language that authorizes the current sys-
tem of setting automobile insurance rates by zip code area." 2 While the
Notice of Proposed Action and Notice of Public Hearing, RH-292 (1991).
One insurance industry representative, Michael McCabe of Allstate Insurance Company,
threatened in a public hearing that if the Insurance Commissioner eliminated or suppressed
territorial rating, "the incentive that affects my behavior is to treat those customers [inner-city
policyholders] as badly as the law allows.... It's an incentive to drive them away." Erik
Ingram, 'Territorial' Rate Plan Draws Fire, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 1989, at Al, A22.
Prior to the passage of Proposition 103, the refusal of insurers to issue policies in African-
American and Hispanic communities was widely known. See, eg., Kenneth Reich, Territorial
Rating Attacked; Reforms Could Put State Into Auto Insurance Business, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24,
1986, at Al.
108. See supra Part I.
109. Two bills introduced in the Assembly during 1985 are illustrative of these efforts.
Assemblywoman Gwen Moore introduced Assembly Bill 654 that would have made the entire
state one territory. Assemblywoman Gloria Molina introduced Assembly Bill 2214 that would
have prohibited the use of any factor other than driving record in setting automobile insurance
premiums. Both measures were defeated in the Assembly Finance Committee in January
1986. Charley Roberts, Redlining Bills Trounced; Highway-Liability Measure Expires, L.A.
DAILY J., Jan. 22, 1986, at 2.
Previous bills to outlaw or ameliorate the practice of territorial rating were introduced in
1973 (A.B. 753), 1975 (A.B. 2755, 2953), and 1978 (A.B. 60, 146 and 282). Assembly Bill 753,
from the 1973-74 session of the legislature, was killed in committee on September 14, 1973.
Assembly Bills 2755 and 2953, introduced during the 1975-76 session of the legislature, both
died in committee on November 30, 1976. Assembly Bills 60, 146, and 282 were all killed in
committee on January 1, 1978.
110. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, INSURANCE AND
COMMERCE, TRANSCRIPT ON THE SUBJECT OF DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE (1976).
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATES AND TERRITORIAL RATING (1977). CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY AD Hoc.COMMrrrEE ON AUTO INSURANCE PRICING, SYNOPSIS
OF PUBLIC HEARING OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON AUTO INSURXNCE PRICING (1977).
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE, CLAIMS AND CORPORA-
TIONS, THE INSURANCE CRISIS: A CASE OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1986).
111. Assembly Con. Res. 100 (stats. 1978).
112. A.B. 3596 (1978). The bill amended § 11628 of the Insurance Code. The statute now
reads as follows:
No admitted insurer, licensed to issue and issuing motor vehicle liability policies as
defined in Section 16540 of the Vehicle Code, shall fail or refuse to accept an applica-
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legislature's intent may have been laudable," 3 this amendment has al-
lowed insurers to draw lines that discriminate between insurance appli-
cants on the basis of race and wealth.
1 1 4
The inability, or unwillingness, of California regulators and legisla-
tors to remedy the racial and economic impact of redlining is attributable
to three factors. First, insurers form a powerful lobby in Sacramento.
Over the years, insurers have given tremendous amounts of money to the
governor and California legislators. 115 Those contributions give insurers
access to the Insurance Commissioner and legislators when measures
they view as inimical, such as attempts to outlaw or modify territorial
rating, come up for hearing." 6
Second, insurers have convinced the public and government that the
elimination of territorial rating will cause a substantial increase of rates
for two-thirds of the state's residents. 7 Insurers have used this allega-
tion for that insurance, to issue that insurance to an applicant therefor, or issue or
cancel that insurance under conditions less favorable to the insured than in other
comparable cases, except for reasons applicable alike to persons of... the same geo-
graphic area .... Differentiation in rates between geographical areas shall not con-
stitute unfair discrimination.
113. Ironically, it appears that the sponsors of A.B. 3596 intended to help consumers by
forcing insurers to draw territories that were more contiguous and homogeneous. See STUDY
OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE BY ZIP CODE (Phase 1), supra note 2, at 59-60.
114. King v. Meese, 743 P.2d 889, 906 (Cal. 1987) (Broussard, J., concurring).
115. Kenneth Reich, Insurance Lobby Gives Lawmakers $1.6 Million, L.A. TIMES, Septem-
ber 16, 1986, at A3; Kenneth Reich, Insurance Firms' Gifts to Governor, Legislators Told, L.A.
TIMES, May 17, 1988, at A3. The latter article reported that, between 1985 and 1987, insurers
gave former Governor Deukmejian $460,645.00 and California legislators $2,713,489.00. The
contributions to the governor are significant because, prior to the passage of Proposition 103,
the Insurance Commissioner was appointed by the governor. Former Cal. Ins. Code § 12900.
116. Two observers of California politics wrote that "Legislators and lobbyists alike assert
that contributions 'buy' access, not votes." LARRY GERSTON & TERRY CHRISTENSEN, CALI-
FORNIA POLITICS & GOVERNMENT: A PRACTICAL APPROACH, 33 (1991). See also Daniel
Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 301, 306-335 (1989); CHARLES BELL & CHARLES PRICE, CALIFORNIA Gov-
ERNMENT TODAY: POLITICS OF REFORM?, 120-121, 128 (3d ed. 1988).
117. Former Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie, for example, announced in 1989
that if territorial rating were eliminated as a rating factor, rates would increase for two-thirds
of the state's drivers. Memorandum from Roxani Gillespie, Insurance Commissioner (August
1989) 2, and chart 1. This is undoubtedly true in a gross sense-the commissioner would have
to allow insurers to raise rates elsewhere to compensate for the lower rates that insurers could
charge drivers in redlined communities.
However, the creation of the good-driver discount policy (CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(b)-
(d)(West 1988)) by Proposition 103 gives the Insurance Commissioner one mechanism by
which he can minimize the economic impact of the change in rating practices.
The commissioner might further minimize the economic impact of eliminating redlining
by carefully structuring the new rates. This is illustrated by the approach taken in New Jersey.
While the Department of Insurance did not eliminate territorial rating, it significantly lowered
its impact. This was accomplished by "tempering" the significance of territorial rating, and
changing the way in which insurers could use territory in calculating rates. NEW JERSEY
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tion to pit other areas of the state against redlined communities. 1 ' This
tactic was used in the insurance industry's campaign against Proposition
103.119
Third, redlining is perceived as a "minority" issue. Most of the or-
ganizations that have actively opposed territorial rating are civil rights
organizations. 120 The measures that have been introduced to eliminate
or ameliorate territorial rating have, with a few exceptions, been intro-
duced by legislators who represent predominantly African-American or
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE CLASSIFICATION: AN OVER-
VIEW OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND REMEDIES at 21, 27-28, 31-32 (April 9, 1981). In
short, New Jersey simply ordered a different, and broader, spreading of the risk. Massachu-
setts, studying a similar approach, concluded that the increase in rates caused would be mini-
mal. STATE RATING BUREAU, MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF INSURANCE, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATION: EQUITY AND ACCURACY, at 100 (1978).
California's Insurance Commissioner could examine the actions taken in New Jersey and
Massachusetts and come up with a plan that would minimize the impact of the elimination of
territorial rating by ordering insurers to spread the risk of loss more broadly (and fairly)
among California drivers.
118. When former Insurance Commissioner Kinder held hearings on territorial rating in
1976, he reported receiving "more than 40,000 cards and letters... from San Diego County
residents alone in support of the present territorial rating system." AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANcE-TERRITORIAL CLASSIFICATIONS-EFFECT ON RATES, RH 207, 26 (California Insur-
ance Commissioner 1979). Professor Wortham has noted that one of the difficulties inherent
in any discussion of rate reform is the fact that it inevitably pits groups against one another.
Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classification: The Sound of One Invisible Hand
Clapping, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 838 (1986).
119. In areas outside of Los Angeles County, the insurance industry campaign claimed that
Proposition 103 would "raise your rates." Kenneth Reich, Insurers Seek to Keep Territorial
Rating; Prop 103 Hearing Warned Change Could Hike Costs In Suburban, Rural Areas, L.A.
TIMES, June 20, 1989, at A3. The tactic was almost successful. The initiative received 51.17%
of the vote-a bare majority. It carried in only eight counties-Los Angeles, Orange, San
Francisco, Alameda, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Matin, and Solano. The State, L.A. TIMES,
December 12, 1988, at A2.
120. Organizations that have been actively opposed to redlining include United Neighbor-
hood Organization (a predominantly Latino organization), the Black Businessmen's Associa-
tion of Los Angeles, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (a predominantly African-
American organization), Merchants 4 Community Improvement (a predominantly African-
American group), and the Committee Against Discrimination in Automobile Insurance (a
predominantly African-American organization). CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATES
AND TERRITORIAL RATING, at 3 (1977); CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY COMMIT-
TEE ON FINANCE, INSURANCE AND COMMERCE, DISCRIMINATION IN INSURANCE at 147
(1976); Ray Estrada, Citizens, Leaders Join Insurance Redlining Fight, THE WAVE, November
27, 1985, at 1. It should be noted that the American Civil Liberties Union litigated Compton
v. Bunner, 243 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Ct. App. 1988), and Public Advocates litigated King v. Meese,
743 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1987). Voter Revolt, the organization which sponsored Proposition 103,
and Consumers Union have also actively opposed redlining in hearings before the Insurance
Commissioner.
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Latino communities.' 21 The main political spokespeople against territo-
rial rating in Los Angeles County have been either minority politicians or
representatives of districts with substantial minority populations. 2 2 Mi-
norities and the poor have a difficult time getting favorable legislative
action because of a lack of money, influence, and power.
123
B. The Legal Debate
Three lawsuits have challenged territorial rating. In County of Los
Angeles v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 24 the County of Los Angeles
sued the Insurance Commissioner of California and several insurance
companies. The lawsuit alleged that the territorial rating practices of
insurance companies discriminated against poor and minority residents
of Los Angeles County by causing residents of inner-city communities to
pay substantially more for automobile liability insurance coverage than
other residents of the state. 125 The Superior Court ruled that the county
was required to exhaust its administrative remedies before it could liti-
gate the issue.'2 6 Following that ruling, the County of Los Angeles peti-
tioned the Insurance Commissioner for relief. The Insurance
Commissioner held a series of hearings in response to the petition and
issued an opinion stating that territorial rating was "actuarially valid."' 27
Following the issuance of the commissioner's finding, the County of Los
Angeles filed suit a second time, alleging that it had now exhausted the
remedies available under the Insurance Code. ' 2 ' Despite the presence of
a clear indication from the Insurance Commissioner that he was unwill-
121. The bills attempting to outlaw or ameliorate territorial rating have been carried by
Assemblywoman Gloria Molina (Latina), Assemblywoman Gwen Moore (African-American),
Assemblyman Richard Montoya (Latino) (A.B. 753, 1973), Assemblywoman Teresa Hughes
(African-American) (A.B. 2953, 1976; A.B. 2755, 1976), and Assemblyman Art Torres (La-
tino) (A.B. 2953, 1976; A.B. 2755, 1976). The notable exceptions to this pattern in the meas-
ures researched were Assemblymen Terry Goggin and William Thomas.
122. Los Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn and California Assemblywoman Max-
ine Waters (African-American), whose districts include large portions of South Central Los
Angeles, have been longstanding opponents of territorial rating. Estrada, supra note 120, at 1;
Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens
and Shareholders Rights & Remedies of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 410
(1978).
123. "Not surprisingly, well-organized, well-financed, prestigious groups ... have always
found ready access in Sacramento; disorganized poor, low-status groups frequently have more
difficulty gaining a serious hearing." BELL & PRICE, supra note 116, at 114.
124. 182 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Ct. App. 1982).
125. Id. at 880.
126. Id at 881.
127. rd at 883; AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-TERRITORIAL CLASSIFICATIONS-EFFECT ON
RATES, RH 207, 37 (Cal. Ins. Comm'r 1979).
128. Farmers Ins Exchange, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
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hmg to grant any relief, the trial court again dismissed the suit. The trial
court ruled that the county's failure to exhaust administrative remedies
barred the lawsuit. 29 The County of Los Angeles appealed that ruling.
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, agreeing that the county
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.130 Following that rul-
ing, the Board of Supervisors decided to drop the lawsuit, even though its
complaint against the Insurance Commissioner was not dismissed.1
3 1
In 1985, the City of Compton, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, and several individual plaintiffs sued the Insurance Commis-
sioner and Farmers Insurance Group. The plaintiffs alleged that redlin-
ing violated the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution
and the Unruh Civil Rights Act 32 because it discriminated against racial
minorities and the poor.1 33 The suit claimed that territorial rating vio-
lated the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution because
section 11628 of the California Insurance Code specifically sanctioned
the practice of redlining.
The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies.1 34 The Court of Appeal agreed that plaintiffs were re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies by petitioning for relief before
the Insurance Commissioner.135 At the same time, the court ruled that
Insurance Code section 11628 prohibited an insurer from charging
higher rates in some territories unless that insurer had in effect a substan-
129. County of Los Angeles v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Nos. C 210895 and C 309260 (Su-
perior Court of Los Angeles County, Vernon G. Foster, Judge.)
130. Farmers Ins Exchange, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 882. The court stated that the Notice of
Public Hearing issued by the Department of Insurance did not indicate that the Commissioner
intended to review all of the allegations of unlawful practices as they related to the insurance
company defendants. The court concluded that, because the county failed to move to compel
the Commissioner to resolve those specific issues, administrative remedies as to Farmers were
not exhausted. Id. at 882-83.
131. Id. at 879. The Board of Supervisors voted to dismiss the litigation on December 7,
1982.
132. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51-52 (West 1992).
133. City of Compton v. Bunner, 243 Cal. Rptr. 100, 106 (Ct. App. 1988).
134. Id. at 107.
135. Id. at 108.09. The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that exhaustion was not required. This
argument was premised on declarations of the Insurance Commissioner and the Department of
Insurance that they would not change the system because territorial rating was "actuarially
sound." Id. at 109, 115-17.
The court observed in its opinion that the Insurance Commissioner and the Department
of Insurance had continually failed to address and resolve the claims of racial and economic
discrimination despite their "sophisticated bodies of expertise in this field." Id. at 116. The
court opined that, should the claims be presented again and the commissioner and the depart-
ment have failed to resolve those claims, "we can presently envision no argument which would
overcome a claim that the futility exception should be applied . . . ." Id. at 116.
tial number of policies within the adversely affected areas.136 The court
held that the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution re-
quired this construction of section 11628.137 While the court ruled that
the Unruh Civil Rights Act did not apply to the business of insurance,
138
it concluded that section 11628 should be construed to prohibit insurance
company discrimination in the same manner as does the Unruh Civil
Rights Act. 139 A group of insurance trade organizations petitioned the
state supreme court to depublish the Bunner opinion, 1 and the supreme
court complied.
141
The third lawsuit mounted a flank attack on territorial rating. In
King v. Meese, 42 the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction sus-
pending the operation of Vehicle Code section 16028.143 They alleged
that redlining, in effect, made it impossible for residents of inner-city ar-
eas to purchase the liability insurance required by the financial responsi-
bility laws. 1" The plaintiffs argued that enforcement of the financial
responsibility laws therefore violated their right to procedural due
process. 
14 5
The trial court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary in-
junction,146 and the supreme court affirmed. 147 It held that the acts of
private insurers were not converted to state action by the state law re-
quiring drivers to buy insurance from them.148 The high court did con-
clude that the decision to impose a fine or suspend a license due to a lack
of insurance is state action. The court held that the state does, as a re-
sult, have a limited constitutional duty to make the required liability in-
136. Id- at 127.
137. Ia
138. Id. at 124. The Court relied upon the language of § 1860.1 of the Insurance Code,
which provides:
No act done, action taken or agreement made pursuant to the authority conferred by
this chapter shall constitute a violation of or grounds for prosecution or civil pro-
ceedings under any other law of this State heretofore or hereafter enacted which does
not specifically refer to insurance.
City of Compton, slip op. at 31.
139. City of Compton v. Bunner, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
140. Letter from Susan Popik of Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnell & Quinn to the California
Supreme Court (June 9, 1988).
141. Depublication was ordered on July 21, 1988.
142. 743 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1987).
143. See supra note 104.
144. King, 743 P.2d at 893.
145. Id. at 894.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 901.
148. Id. at 896.
Sorine 19921 TERRITORIAL RATING
868 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:845
surance available in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor capricious.1
49
But the court determined that the state had met that burden through its
creation of the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan.15 0
C. The Effects of Proposition 103
In 1988, a new factor was injected into the debate when California
voters approved Proposition 103. Proposition 103 was an initiative mea-
sure that radically altered the law concerning automobile insurance rate
setting and the regulation of the business of insurance.151
Proposition 103 significantly changed the law concerning the use of
territorial rating. The initiative did not repeal Insurance Code § 11628.
Nevertheless, it did declare that automobile insurance premium rates
shall be set using three primary rating criteria: the individual insured's
driving record, the number of miles driven by the insured annually, and
the number of years of driving experience of the insured.' 52 Before any
other rating factor may be used by an insurer, the Insurance Commis-
sioner must approve its use. The Commissioner may approve the use of
an additional factor only if it has "a substantial relationship to the risk of
lOSS.' 1 5 3
149. Id. at 897.
150. Id. The majority wrote that there was "some persuasive force" to the plaintiffs' con-
cer that the lack of procedural safeguards leads to a feeling of helplessness among those
unable to afford or obtain private insurance. They stated that the plaintiffs had to make their
case for relief to the Legislature. Id. at 900. In light of the long, futile history of attempts to
gain legislative relief from redlining, see supra notes 109-121, this was truly an empty
observation.
151. Proposition 103 was an initiative measure approved by a majority of California voters
in November 1988. Initiatives are proposed laws or constitutional amendments voted on by the
electorate. Proposition 103 was placed on the ballot by presenting a petition to the Secretary of
State. The petition contained the language of the proposed law, and the signatures of five
percent of the state's registered voters. CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 9.
152. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.02(a)(1)-(3)(West Supp. 1992).
153. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(4)(West Supp. 1992). Insurance companies have ar-
gued vigorously that the Insurance Commissioner should reinstate the practice of territorial
rating under this provision. The issue has taken a series of perilous turns, On October 2, 1989,
former Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie announced that she intended to ban the use
of territorial rating. Kenneth Reich, Auto Insurance Rate Hikes Frozen; 6-month Ban Sparked
by 'Chorus' of Proposed Increases, Gillespie Says, L.A. TIMES, October 3, 1989, at Al. Follow-
ing a storm of insurance industry protest, Commissioner Gillespie reversed that decision, an-
nouncing proposed regulations that allowed the use of territorial rating in a modified form.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, ch. 5, sub. 4.7, § 2632.6(c) (proposed December 5, 1989). Despite
Commissioner Gillespie's action, several insurers successfully sued to enjoin the enforcement
of those regulations. While that litigation was pending John Garamendi took office as Insur-
ance Commissioner. Commissioner Garamendi allowed the regulations proposed by former
Commissioner Gillespie to lapse. On January 22, 1992 the Court of Appeal issued its opinion
in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, No. B050439, 1992 Cal. App. Lexis 72 (January 22, 1992).
The court dismissed as moot the appeal from that portion of the injunction restraining imple-
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Proposition 103 also made an important change in the regulatory
structure for insurance. California was an "open rating" state, meaning
that insurance rates did not have to be approved by the Insurance Com-
missioner.' 54 With the passage of Proposition 103, all insurance rates
must be approved by the commissioner before they may go into effect.' 5
D. The Insurers' Defense of Territorial Rating
Insurers and their allies have mounted a spirited defense of territo-
rial rating in legislative, administrative, and public debates. The defend-
ers of territorial rating concede that neighborhoods do not cause
accidents.' 56 In making their case, proponents of territorial rating have
never denied that the practice adversely affects racial minorities and the
poor.'57 Instead, they have based their defense exclusively on the premise
that territory is an accurate predictor of expected losses.
The California Department of Insurance and each of the three In-
surance Commissioners who preceded John Garamendi in office' 5 8 have
defended redlining on this basis. A study issued by the Rate Regulation
mentation of the regulations announced by Commissioner Gillespie. Id. at 44. The case was
then remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate the remainder of the preliminary
injunction in view of Commissioner Garamendi's intention to adopt new regulations. Id.
154. CAL INS. CODE § 1850 (repealed 1988).
155. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1861.05-.09 (West Supp. 1992).
156. Public Hearings of the Insurance Commissioner Relating to Automobile Insurance;
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, RATE REGULATION DIVISION, STUDY OF CALI-
FORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE (Phase II), at 193 (1979). Territory is really a surrogate, an
easily administered substitute for a complex of factors which actually explain the risk of loss
within different neighborhoods. The California Department of Insurance summarized those
factors:
The factors tied closely to geographic location which have an impact upon auto-
mobile liability insurance costs include the following: topography; climate; street and
highway design; road repair; traffic density and traffic flows; economic conditions,
such as wage levels, the cost of hospital and medical services, and the cost of automo-
bile repairs; etc.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, RATE REGULATION DIVISION, STUDY OF CALI-
FORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE (Phase II), at 194 (1979). See also Public Hearings of the
Insurance Commissioner Relating to Automobile Insurance, supra note 156; AUTOMOBILE IN-
SURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATION: EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra note 117.
157. See, eg., Kenneth Reich, Territorial Rating Attacked: Reforms Could Put State into
Auto Insurance Business, L.A. TIMES, November 24, 1986, at Al. The article quotes George
Tye, executive manager of the Association of California Insurance Companies: "A lot of peo-
ple that are being charged $2,000 are the lower economic strata. They simply can't afford that.
It's a problem that's been brewing for years. We're trying to do something about it." In the
same article John McCann, a California spokesperson for the Insurance Information Institute,
conceded in his interview that "[iut's too expensive for people to operate an automobile in the
inner city and actually pay for the insurance." Id.
158. Garamendi is the first Insurance Commissioner elected pursuant to the provisions of
Proposition 103. CAL. INS. CODE § 12900 (West Supp. 1992).
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Division of the California Department of Insurance in 1979 concluded
that driving performance "appears to vary significantly by geographic
area."
159
Pursuant to the initial trial court ruling requiring exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies in County of Los Angeles v. Farmers Insurance, the
County of Los Angeles filed a petition with the Insurance Commissioner
seeking relief from territorial rating.'" Insurance Commissioner Wesley
Kinder held administrative hearings in response to that petition. Follow-
ing those hearings, Commissioner Kinder concluded: "If territorial dis-
tinctions can be found to have predictive value, then the use of such a
standard must be deemed 'fair' and reasonable."' 61  Commissioner
Kinder further stated:
[E]ven if it could be shown that territorial boundaries have been
deliberately or even accidentally drawn to reflect racial or ethnic
concentrations, that fact alone would not explain existing premium
differences, which are the result of differences in loss costs.
1 62
In line with these observations and the conclusions of the Study of Driv-
ing Performance, the commissioner found that territorial rating was "ac-
tuarially valid."'
16 3
In 1985, then-Insurance Commissioner Bruce Bunner and Everett
Brookhart, the Chief of Consumer Affairs for the Department of Insur-
ance, publicly reiterated that territorial rating was "justified."' 16' And
before she left office, Commissioner Roxani Gillespie defended the prac-
tice of territorial rating, stating that "all the experts at our hearing, in-
cluding those from the consumer groups, recognize that 'territory' is a
valid rating factor."16
The insurance industry has vehemently defended the practice of ter-
ritorial rating. During hearings on the implementation of Proposition
103, insurance industry executives urged the Insurance Commissioner to
allow territorial rating to be used as a prime factor in setting rates, de-
159. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, RATE REGULATION DIVISION, STUDY
OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE BY Zip CODE (Phase II) 210 (1979).
160. County of Los Angeles v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 182 Cal. Rptr. 879 (Ct. App. 1982).
161. In The Matter of the Public Hearings of the Insurance Commissioner Relating to Auto-
mobile Insurance-Territorial Classifications-Effect on Rates, RH 207, 35 (Cal. Ins. Comm'r
1979).
162. Id. at 18.
163. Id. at 37.
164. Kenneth Reich, Agency Favors Car Insurance Rates Change, L.A. TIMES, March 5,
1986, at Al. Bunner and Brookhart did change their position after the Comparative Premium
Survey was published. Id.
165. Notice Accompanying Proposed Regulations, Dec. 5, 1989, at 2.
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spite the express language of Proposition 103.166 In the course of those
hearings, one industry representative claimed that the elimination of ter-
ritorial rating would usurp the economic process in the interest of "so-
cially based pricing."
16 1
The industry has funded two studies that defend the practice of ter-
ritorial rating. The most extensive was a study published by the Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) in 1976.168 The SRI study acknowledged that
geographical divisions are correlated with factors such as income level
and race, due to forced segregation and natural aggregation.1 69 Neverthe-
less, the SRI researchers concluded that insurance companies should be
free to use territorial rating if territory is an accurate predictor of loss. 170
A second study, completed in 1980, concluded that approximately half of
all automobile accidents involving injury occur within five miles of home,
while approximately ninety percent of all accidents occurred within
thirty miles of home. 71
M. Territorial Rating and the Equal Protection Clauses of the
California Constitution
Under the California Constitution, "[t]he concept of the equal pro-
tection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons
similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law re-
ceive like treatment." '17 2 A decision by the Insurance Commissioner to
sanction the continued use of territorial rating would violate this funda-
mental proposition of law because residents of poor and minority com-
munities do not receive like treatment. The California Constitution
should be construed to prohibit state approval of territorial rating be-
cause the practice imposes additional burdens on those communities.
166. Kenneth Reich, Insurers Seek to Keep Territorial Ratings, L.A. TIMEs, June 20, 1989,
at A3. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
167. Erik Ingram, "Territorial" Rate Plan Draws Fire, S.F. CHRON, June 23, 1989, at Al
(quoting Michael McCabe, Vice President of Allstate Insurance).
168. BARBARA CASEY, JACQUES PEZIER, CARL SPETZLER, STANFORD RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, THE ROLE OF RISK CLASSIFICATIONS IN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE: A
STUDY OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS (1976).
169. I at 91.
170. Id.
171. ANN DURAND, ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, AN ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT, LOCATION IN RELATION TO AREA OF RESIDENCE 1, 3 (1980). This study was
undoubtedly commissioned to respond to the argument that the territorial rating system,
which is based on where a car is garaged, is unfair because urban residents are forced to pay
for accidents caused by suburban commuters driving into their communities for work, thereby
adding to the congestion and the number of accidents.
172. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P.2d 645, 653 (Cal. 1969).
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A. The Problem of State Action
1. State Action under the Federal Constitution
Automobile insurance is sold by private companies. Thus the initial
obstacle to the application of equal protection analysis to the problem of
territorial rating is satisfying the requirement of state action.
173
The state action doctrine, such as it is, 174 evolved in decisions inter-
preting the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal consti-
tution. 17' The Fourteenth Amendment forbids "only such action as may
fairly be said to be that of the States."' 176 When a claim of constitutional
violation is based on the activities of private parties, the determination of
whether their conduct is state action must be made on a case-by-case
basis, by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances."'
' 77
The conservative majority on the present Supreme Court has nar-
rowed the range of cases where state action will be found. 178 Two of the
cases decided by the Supreme Court during that narrowing process are
particularly pertinent to this discussion. In Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 179 the Court held that extensive regulation of an industry
does not, by itself, convert the actions of a private entity into state ac-
tion.' 8I The plaintiff must show a sufficiently close "nexus" between the
state and the challenged action before the action of the private party may
be treated as state action.'
81
In an attempt to show that the required nexus was present in Jack-
son, the plaintiff advanced three arguments relevant to the discussion of
173. In King v. Meese, supra notes 142-50, the California Supreme Court held that the state
requirement that drivers purchase automobile insurance does not convert the actions of private
insurers into state action.743 P.2d 889, 896 (Cal. 1987).
174. The "doctrine" of state action has been described as "a conceptual disaster area."
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Pro-
tection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). See generally LAU-
RENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 18-1 (2d ed. 1988); 2 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE,
§ 16.1 (1986).
175. The relevant language of the Fourteenth Amendment provides.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
176. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
177. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
178. Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 644-45 (1991).
179. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
180. Id. at 350.
181. Id. at 351.
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the problem of redlining. The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention
that the monopoly status of the defendant utility created the required
nexus."8 2 The Court also rebuffed plaintiff's claim that the nexus was
present because the utility performed a public function by providing an
essential service. 18  Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff's assertion
that the required nexus was created by the state's authorization of the
termination practice that was the subject of the lawsuit.1 8 4 The Court
held that approval by the state of the utility's request for approval of its
business practices did not constitute state action, reasoning that the ap-
proval did not place the imprimatur of the state on the practice.18 5 The
Court contrasted the situation in Jackson with the facts in Public Utility
Commission v. Pollack,"8 6 where the government investigated the pro-
posed practice, and approved it after finding that the practice was "not
inconsistent with public convenience, comfort and safety."
187
The second state action case decided by the United States Supreme
Court that is relevant to this discussion is Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks.88
In Flagg Bros., the Court rejected the contention that a statute authoriz-
ing warehousemen to seize and sell a bailor's property for unpaid storage
charges constituted state action. 8 9 Citing Jackson and Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis,19° Justice Rehnquist wrote:
These cases clearly rejected the notion that our prior cases permit-
ted the imposition of Fourteenth Amendment restraints on private
action by the simple device of characterizing the State's inaction as
"authorization" or "encouragement." ' 191
Based on this premise, the Court held that the enactment of the statute
did not create the necessary nexus because the state was in no way re-
sponsible for Flagg Brothers' decision to take the plaintiff's property. 92
182. Id at 351-52.
183. Id at 352-54.
184. Id at 356-57. Although not the focus of this discussion, the Court also rejected the
argument that the utility shared a symbiotic relationship with the state. Id at 357-58.
185. Id. at 357.
186. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
187. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 356-57.
188. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
189. Id. at 164.
190. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
191. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164-65.
192. Id at 165. The Court had noted earlier in its opinion that there were no state officials
as defendants in the action. Id at 157.
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2. State Action under the California Constitution193
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution, the
equal protection clauses of the California Constitution do not contain
language requiring state action.' 94 The California Supreme Court has
noted this textual distinction.'95 Nevertheless, the California court has
consistently held that state action is required to invoke the equal protec-
tion guarantees of the California Constitution. 9 6
The task of establishing state action under the California Constitu-
tion is less daunting than it is under the current federal standard. 197 The
California Supreme Court has stressed that its interpretation of the state
equal protection clauses is independent of the federal courts' state action
analysis:
[A]lthough our court will carefully consider federal state action
decisions with respect to the federal equal protection clause insofar
as they are persuasive, we do not consider ourselves bound by such
decisions in interpreting the reach of the safeguards of our state
equal protection clause.' 98
California courts have used three state action theories that are appli-
cable to analysis of the use of territorial rating: 1) state authorization or
encouragement of private activity; 2) pervasive state regulation of private
entities; and 3) symbiotic relationship.
193. While the problem of territorial rating has received some attention in scholarly
quarters, most of that attention has been focused on the federal equal protection issues raised
by the practice. See, e.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA.
L. REv. 517 (1983); and Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to
the Actuaries, 19 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 349 (1986) [hereinafter Insurance Classification]. That is
a subject worthy of continued examination, despite the substantial state action barriers posed
by current federal constitutional law.
194. Article I, § 7(a) of the California Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "A
person may not be... denied equal protection of the laws." The relevant portion of Article I,
§ 7(b) provides that "A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities
not granted on the same terms to all citizens." Article IV, § 16(a) provides that "All laws of a
general nature have uniform operation."
195. Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 P.2d 441, 449-50 (Cal. 1974); Gay Law Students'
Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 598 (Cal. 1979).
196. See, e.g., Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 598; and Kruger, 521 P.2d at 450.
The California Supreme Court has held that the state constitutional guarantees of the
right to privacy, the right to freedom of speech, and the right to petition the government apply
to certain actions of private parties. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal.
1979) (freedom of speech, petition); see also Porten v. University of S. F, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839,
842 (Ct. App. 1976) (privacy); Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr.
194, 200 (Ct. App. 1989) (privacy). These decisions are based upon the absence of language
referring to the "state" in the relevant constitutional provisions. See Jennifer Friesen, Should
California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Actors?, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111 (1989).
197. See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
198. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 595 P.2d at 598.
874
a. State Encouragement of Territorial Rating
The first theory on which a finding of state action could be premised
in California is properly characterized as an authorization or encourage-
ment analysis. Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles exemplifies this
approach. 99 In Adams, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the
garagemen's labor and materials lien law.2" The lien law authorized an
unpaid garageman to retain and sell vehicles that had been repaired. The
law required the Department of Motor Vehicles to transfer registration
to the purchaser, but did not require the department to conduct a hear-
ing before transferring the registration.2°0 The California Supreme Court
found that this system entailed state action.20 2 The Adams opinion listed
the factors leading to this conclusion:
The vehicle service lien and the procedures for its enforcement are
created and governed by statute. The procedure is administered by
the Department of Motor Vehicles, and transfer of title to the lien
sale purchaser is ultimately recorded by the department. "Thus,
although a private individual retains and sells the car, his power to
do so arises from and is subject to specific provisions of state stat-
ute and his exercise of that power is supervised by the
department.
20 3
Adams clearly rejects the reasoning utilized by the United States
Supreme Court in Flagg Bros.' The California Supreme Court found
specifically that the fact that the seizure and sale were conducted without
the aid of state personnel was not dispositive. The court held that since
the ability to perform these acts was permitted only by statute, the state's
involvement in the imposition and enforcement of the garageman's liens
constituted state action.20 5
The practice of territorial rating is authorized by section 11628 of
the Insurance Code.20 6 Insurance Code section 1861.01 does not allow
insurers to use territorial rating without the approval of the Insurance
Commissioner.20 7 Thus, although private entities sell the insurance, their
ability to use territorial rating will arise from the specific provisions of
those statutes. Moreover, since the Insurance Commissioner must ap-
prove of the use of territorial rating, and of the rates set under that sys-
199. 520 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1974)
200. Then codified in CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3068-3074 (West Supp. 1974, 1992).
201. Adams, 520 P.2d at 963.
202. Id at 965.
203. Id (citations omitted).
204. 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
205. Adams, 520 P.2d at 965.
206. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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tern,20 8 the insurers' use of that rating criteria will be created and
supervised by the commissioner and the Department of Insurance. 0 9
The combination of these facts and actions would constitute state action
under the encouragement theory.
21 0
There is, however, an objection to a finding of state action under this
theory. Territorial rating was a practice of the insurance industry prior
to the enactment of Insurance Code section 11628.211 Powers that a pri-
vate entity already possesses do not become state action merely because
they are codified. A leading California case articulating this principle is
Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank.2 12 In Kruger, the bank deducted money
from the plaintiff's checking account to satisfy an overdue credit card
payment.2 1 3 The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the bank's
exercise of its right of set-off. That right was codified in former Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure section 440. The California Supreme Court
held that the bank's exercise of its right of set-off did not constitute state
action despite the existence of the statute authorizing the set-off.
2 14
The court observed that the statute at issue "merely codified the
right of setoff as it existed in courts of equity. '2 15 The court reasoned
that the statute was "neutral," because it neither compelled nor en-
couraged the right of set-off.2 16 The key to the court's conclusion that
the statute did not convert the bank's action into state action was ex-
pressed as follows:
"The right of set-off, while recognized by the statute, was not cre-
ated by it. The right is grounded in general principals of equity.
'In equity, a set-off... depends, not upon the [s]tatutes of [slet-
[o]ff, but upon the equitable jurisdiction of the Court over its suit-
ors.' Hobbs v. Duff, 23 Cal. 596, 629 (1863). Thus, if Section 440
208. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05-.055 (West Supp. 1992).
209. The Commissioner may not approve of the use of territorial rating unless she or he
finds that it bears a "substantial relationship to the risk of loss." CAL. INS. CODE
§ 1861.02(a)(4) (West Supp. 1992). State approval of a return to territorial rating would thus
place the imprimatur of the state on the practice. This would satisfy the more restrictive fed-
eral state action standard articulated in Flagg Bros. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying
text.
210. See Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 520 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1974).
211. Territorial rating in some form has been in existence since at least 1917. H. JEROME
ZOFFER, THE HISTORY OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE RATING 11 (1959); In The
Matter of the Public Hearings of the Insurance Commissioner Relating to Automobile Insur-
ance-Territorial Classifications-Effect on Rates, RH 207, 9 (California Insurance
Commissioner).
212. 521 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1974).
213. Id. at 442.
214. Id
215. Id. at 445.
216. Id. at 447.
never had been enacted, the Bank would still have had the right to
balance off mutual obligations." A statute which neither adds new
rights nor permits private conduct prohibited under the common
law, does not raise the conduct to the level of state action.
217
A second factor in Kruger that persuaded the court that exercise of
the right of set-off did not constitute state action was that "the procedure
of set-off, in contrast to other prejudgment remedies, require[d] no act of
assistance from state officials." '218
Insurance companies might be expected to argue that their use of
territorial rating parallels the bank's use of set-off in Kruger. They would
assert that insurance companies had a common law right to refuse to
insure anyone.219 They would also state that section 11628 was merely a
codification of their preexisting common law right to engage in territorial
rating. Based on these two assertions, insurers would argue that the exist-
217. Id (quoting Jojola v. Wells Fargo Bank (N.D. Cal. 1973 No. C-71 900 SAW)). The
supreme court later criticized this reasoning:
In Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 362-363 [521 P.2d 441, 447],
we suggested that private summary seizure would be more likely to constitute a form
of state action if that seizure was based upon a statute which created a remedy un-
known to the common law. This reasoning has been criticized on the ground that the
degree of state involvement in the remedy does not turn upon the age or origin of the
remedy [citation omitted], and indeed remedies of venerable common law origin such
as garnishment and attachment have been held to involve state action. [Citations
omitted]. We do not therefore rest our holding that stop notice procedures involve
state action merely upon the fact that the procedure was created by statute.
Connolly Dev. Inc. v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 637, 645 n.14 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
218. Kruger, 521 P.2d at 445.
219. K.C. Working Chem. Co. v. Eureka-Security Fire And Marine Ins. Co. of Cincinnati,
Ohio, 185 P.2d 832, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947). This case did hold that an insurance company
is not bound to accept an application or proposal for insurance. Id
The validity of this holding is doubtful. Insurance companies are enterprises affected with
a public interest. Such enterprises are marked by the following characteristics: 1) they are
involved in a business generally thought suitable for public regulation; 2) they perform a ser-
vice of great importance to the public; 3) they hold themselves out as willing to perform the
service for any member of the public who needs it, or at least for any member coming within
established standards; and 4) they possess, due to the essential nature of the service, a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1963).
This is an accurate description of insurance companies and their relationship to the pub-
lic. The business of insurance is clearly thought to be suitable for public regulation, a proposi-
tion evidenced by the existence of the California Insurance Commissioner and the extensive
statutory provisions found in the California Insurance Code and the statutes of all of the 50
states. Insurance is generally recoguized as a matter of overwhelming importance to the pub-
lic. See, eg., Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service
Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1263-64, 1273-76 (1967). Auto-
mobile liability insurance is essential due to the mandatory liability insurance laws. Insurance
companies hold themselves out as willing to provide that service for any member of the public
who seeks it, so long as that person meets certain established standards. And insurance com-
panies obviously possess a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the
SDrine 19921 TERRITORIAL RATING
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ence of section 11628 and a decision by the Insurance Commissioner to
permit the use of territorial rating would not convert their actions into
state action.
Whatever the case may have been prior to the passage of Proposi-
tion 103, it is clear that insurance companies of this state do not at this
point have a preexisting right to use territorial rating. They will not be
able to use this rating factor unless the Insurance Commissioner affirma-
tively decides that territorial rating is permissible. The right of insurance
companies to engage in territorial rating would be created by the Com-
missioner's approval under the terms of section 1861.01 of the Insurance
Code. Moreover, insurers' ability to engage in territorial rating will re-
quire the assistance and approval of state officials, since all rates must be
approved by the Insurance Commissioner before they may go into ef-
fect.2 Should the Commissioner approve the continued usage of terri-
torial rating, his action will constitute affirmative state endorsement of,
involvement in, and assistance to, the insurer's practice of redlining.1'
This would not be a "neutral" action, as that term is defined in Kruger.
Instead, approval would be more akin to the actions of the state in the
Adams case, where state action was found.
222
b. Pervasive State Regulation of the Insurance Industry
The second California theory of state action might be characterized
as a "pervasive regulation" standard. Under this standard, state action is
found where the breadth and depth of governmental regulation of an en-
tity's business practices inextricably ties the state to the entity's conduct.
This theory of state action is articulated in Gay Law Students v. Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph.223 In that case, gay individuals and organiza-
public who seeks their services. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins. of the
State of Kan., 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
Since the insurance business is affected with a public interest, it can be argued convinc-
ingly that insurance companies did not have a common law right to discriminate. At common
law, an enterprise affected with a public interest has a duty to serve all customers on reason-
able terms without discrimination. Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d 592, 606. But see Harris v.
Capital Growth Investors XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 888 n.13 (Cal. 1991) (arguing that the common
law duty does not extend to pricing decisions).
220. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1860.05-.055 (West Supp. 1992).
221. An additional factor that distinguishes this problem from the Kruger case is the fact
that Kruger involved a procedural due process claim - plaintiff claiming that she had a right
to notice and some type of hearing before the bank took her money. The California Supreme
Court stated in its Gay Law Students opinion that a more exacting standard of state action is
applied in procedural due process cases than in cases involving discrimination that violates the
equal protection clause. Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 601 n.9.
222. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
223. 595 P.2d at 598.
tions alleged that Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (PT&T), a
privately owned public utility company, discriminated against gays and
lesbians. The California Supreme Court found that employment discrim-
ination against gays and lesbians was not prohibited by the state's Fair
Employment Practices Act.224 At the same time, the court held that the
plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under the equal protection clauses
of the California Constitution.
A number of factors led the court to conclude that discrimination in
employment by PT&T was state action. The court began by stating that
the California regulatory scheme demonstrates that the state expects a
public utility to conduct its affairs more like a governmental entity than
like a private corporation.225 It based this conclusion on the state's es-
tablishment of the prices a utility charges for its services and of the stan-
226Thcordards that govern its facilities and services. The court pointed out that
the state determines the system and form of accounts and records that a
public utility maintains, and exercises special scrutiny over the utility's
issuance of stocks and bonds.227 Finally, the court noted that many utili-
ties, including PT&T, have the power of eminent domain.22 The court
concluded that under these circumstances a public utility cannot claim
the prerogatives of "private autonomy" that may attach to a purely pri-
vate business enterprise.229
The court then outlined three additional factors that led it to con-
clude that the alleged actions of PT&T, if proven, would constitute state
action. First, the exclusion from employment in a quasi-monopolistic
situation is particularly egregious because the victim has limited alterna-
tives available. Whereas a person seeking employment from a single pri-
vate employer can generally find the same job opportunity elsewhere, the
prospective employee of a state regulated utility may have no such option
because the utility is the only employer in the area offering certain
jobs.230 The court stated that this lack of competition removes even the
"limited check" that competition places on employment discrimination,
because the state-protected utility does not have to worry that a qualified
applicant will be hired by a competitor seeking competitive advantage.
231
224. Id at 612.





230. The complaint alleged that many of the jobs available at PT&T required skills useful
only in telephone companies. Id at 596.
231. Id. at 599-600.
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Second, the court observed that the public cannot avoid giving indi-
rect support to the discriminatory practices of a public utility. Where
ordinary private businesses are involved, the public can boycott those
who discriminate. But in the case of a public utility, no such option is
available, since the utility has a state-granted monopoly over provision of
the service.232
The third factor that led the court to conclude that PT&T's actions
constituted state action is the source of the utility's quasi-monopolistic
power over employment opportunities. That power is directly derived
from a state-provided exclusive franchise. Since the state has immunized
public utilities from the check of free market competition, the state has
placed the utility in a position to wield enormous power over an individ-
ual's employment opportunities.233 The court concluded that "Under
these circumstances, PT&T can point to no legitimate countervailing in-
terest in 'privacy' or 'personal autonomy' which could reasonably justify
exempting its discriminatory employment practices from constitutional
constraints.
234
The Gay Law Students opinion states that its holding is limited to
the narrow but important question of whether the equal protection
clauses are violated when a privately owned public utility excludes a class
of individuals from employment opportunities. 35 The question in the
auto insurance context is equally important: whether the equal protec-
tion clauses are violated when privately owned insurance companies de-
prive classes of people of the important ability to drive by engaging in
territorial rating. Since territorial rating effectively precludes residents of
inner city communities from buying the insurance coverage required by
the state, state action should be found if the Insurance Commissioner
approves of its use.
A majority of the factors that led to a finding of state action in Gay
Law Students would also be present if the Commissioner allows territo-
rial rating. The importance of the issue and the similarity of the factors
present call for application of the pervasive-regulation state action theory
invoked in Gay Law Students to the analysis of territorial rating.
Even before the passage of Proposition 103, the regulatory system
governing insurance resembled the regulatory system governing utilities.
Businesses cannot write insurance in California without a state-issued li-
232. Id. at 600.
233. Id.
234. Id. The reasoning of the Gay Law Students opinion is directly contrary to the ration-
ale expressed by the majority in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co, 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See
supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
235. Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 598-99.
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cense.2 36 In order to obtain that license, insurers must meet capital re-
quirements and surplus requirements set by law.237 The state sets the
minimum reserves a liability carrier must maintain.238 The state deter-
mines the system and form of insurance company financial statements.
239
The state also exercises special scrutiny over the issuance of stocks and
bonds by admitted insurers. 2' The state determines the kinds of securi-
ties insurers may invest their assets in.241 The state also dictates how
insurers may invest their excess funds.242
With the passage of Proposition 103, the regulatory scheme for the
business of insurance became more pervasive. The prices that insurers
charge for their products and the standards that govern their services are
now established by the state.243 Insurers have been directed to provide
good-driver discount plans, and the statute sets the terms and conditions
under which insurers must accept such drivers for coverage. 2 " Finally,
Proposition 103 limited the grounds on which an insurer can cancel an
automobile insurance policy.245
The characteristics of the regulatory scheme for automobile insur-
ance parallel the characteristics of the regulatory scheme that led the
court to conclude that state action was present in Gay Law Students.246
The three additional factors that led to the finding of state action in the
Gay Law Students opinion are also present, in various permutations, in
the automobile insurance context. First, although there is no state-pro-
tected monopoly present,247 approval by the Insurance Commissioner of
the use of territorial rating will harm the victims of redlining more than
PT&T's decision to discriminate harmed gay job applicants. In Gay Law
Students, the court was concerned because the job seekers had available
only limited alternatives.2 4 If the Commissioner allows insurers to use
236. CAL. INS. CODE § 700 (West 1972). The sections of the Insurance Code cited in notes
237-45 infra remain in effect.
237. Id §§ 700.01-700.05.
238. Id §§ 11557-11558.
239. Id §§ 900-925.4.
240. Id §§ 820-860.
241. Id §§ 1170-1182.
242. Id §§ 1190-1202.
243. Id §§ 1861.01(c), 1861.05.
244. Id § § 1861.02(b), 1861.025.
245. Id § 1861.03(c).
246. The only thing that is markedly different is that insurers do not have the power of
eminent domain. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific TeL and TeL Co., 595 P.2d 592, 599 (Cal.
1979).
247. The law does countenance some anticompetitive practices by the insurance industry,
such as the sharing of loss experience data. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(b) (West 1972).
248. 595 P.2d at 596.
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territorial rating, then his action will leave residents of the inner cities in
Los Angeles County and the San Francisco Bay Area with no alternative
for avoiding the discriminatory prices forced on them by territorial rat-
ing.2 49 When this effect is coupled with the financial responsibility
laws,25 ° it is apparent that approval of territorial rating will be more dev-
astating than the discrimination at issue in Gay Law Students.
The second factor in Gay Law Students leading to the state action
finding was the public's inability to avoid indirect support of the discrim-
inatory practices of a public utility. Because of the state-granted monop-
oly, consumers did not have the option of boycotting PT&T.25' That will
also be the case if the Insurance Commissioner approves of the use of
territorial rating. California drivers cannot lawfully avoid giving indirect
support to the insurance industry's discriminatory practices because they
must buy liability insurance.2 52 That state coercion, coupled with the
fact that all insurance companies engage in the practice of territorial rat-
ing, creates a situation identical to the situation identified by the court in
Gay Law Students.
The third state action factor in Gay Law Students was the enormous
power over an individual's employment opportunities created by the
state's actions.25 3 The insurance industry's ability to engage in territorial
rating, and the uniformity of the practice within California, will be di-
rectly attributable to state action if the Insurance Commissioner ap-
proves the use of territorial rating.25 The requirement that drivers
purchase automobile liability insurance is directly attributable to state
action. The state has thus placed the insurance industry in a position
where it can wield enormous power over an individual's right to drive.
Since that enormous power is directly attributable to actions of the state,
249. Territorial rating is utilized by all insurance companies licensed to issue automobile
insurance in California. See supra note 2. It can be convincingly argued that the victims of
redlining are in a worse position than were the individual plaintiffs in Gay Law Students. The
plaintiffs in that case could go to areas of the state not serviced by PT&T and seek employment
free of the defendant's allegedly discriminatory practices. While the victims of redlining can,
theoretically, move to an area that is not redlined, in reality their options are limited by eco-
nomics and the unspoken racial restrictions that still exist in American society. See supra Part
I.A.2.
250. See supra Part I.B.
251. Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 596.
252. See supra Part I.B.
253. 595 P.2d at 600.
254. In addition, it must be remembered that the existence of communities that are identifi-
ably Black, Hispanic, Asian and/or poor is attributable, at least in part, to state action. Ser-
rano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1254 (Cal. 1971); San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson,
479 P.2d 669, 676 (Cal. 1971). 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 348-49 (Pantheon Books 1972) (1944).
TERRITORIAL RATING
insurers can point to no legitimate countervailing interest in privacy or
personal autonomy that could reasonably justify exempting their dis-
criminatory practices from constitutional constraints.
255
c. Symbiotic Relationship
The third theory of state action applicable to this problem was ar-
ticulated by the California Supreme Court in Mulkey v. Reitman,
2 56
when it declared Proposition 14 unconstitutional. Proposition 14 was an
initiative measure that amended the California Constitution to prohibit
state and local governments from denying, limiting, or abridging the
right of any person to decline to sell property to anyone that person
chose.257 The amendment was passed to nullify legislation intended to
eliminate housing discrimination in California. 2 8 The Unruh Civil
Rights Act,259 which included language prohibiting discrimination by
real estate brokers;21 the Hawkins Act,2 61 which prohibited racial dis-
crimination in publicly assisted housing; measures prohibiting restrictive
racial covenants; 262 and the Rumford Fair Housing Act 263 were exam-
ples of measures that Proposition 14 was intended to prohibit and re-
peal.264 The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Proposition 14
under the California and federal constitutions.265
The California Supreme Court acknowledged that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 266 may be invoked only where
the state is significantly involved in the discriminatory conduct.2 67 Cit-
255. Gay Law Students, 595 P.2d at 600. In King v. Meese, the majority argued in a foot-
note that the business of insurance only shares one characteristic with PT&T-the public's
need to buy the product. 743 P.2d 889, 896-97 n.12 (1987). As the foregoing discussion illus-
trates, the court's summary dismissal of the parallels between insurers and public utilities is
too facile.
256. 413 P.2d 825 (Cal. 1966).
257. Id. at 828.
258. IM at 829.
259. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (Deering 1990).
260. Id. § 51. See Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 370 P.2d 313, 316 (Cal. 1962); Lee v.
O'Hara, 370 P.2d 321, 321-22 (Cal. 1962).
261. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35741 (repealed 1963) (West 1973).
262. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 53, 782 (Deering 1990).
263. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35744 (West 1973).
264. Mulkey, 413 P.2d at 829.
265. The plaintiffs were two African-Americans who attempted to rent an apartment in
Orange County. The landlords and managers refused to rent an apartment to the plaintiffs
because of their race. The plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the refusal to rent to them violated
the Unruh Act. The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that the passage of
Proposition 14 invalidated the Unruh Act. Mulkey, 413 P.2d at 827.
266. The court found it unnecessary to discuss the constitutionality of the measure under
the state constitution. Id. at 828.
267. Id. at 830.
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ing federal precedent, the court stated that conduct that is formally pri-
vate can become so intertwined with governmental policies that it too
will be deemed state action.26 ' The court then held that state action is
present whenever the state, in any meaningful way, lends its processes to
the achievement of discrimination, even though that goal was not within
the state's purpose.2 69 The Mulkey opinion, citing Shelley v. Kraemer,270
also declares that whenever one who seeks to discriminate solicits and
obtains the aid of government in accomplishing that goal, "significant
state action, within the prescription of the equal protection clause, is in-
volved." The court further held that this is true "even where the actor is
a private citizen motivated by purely personal interests." "T7
Finally, the Mulkey opinion, citing several United States Supreme
Court opinions, emphatically declared that state authorization of private
discriminatory conduct is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
The court concluded that such publicly aided private discrimination is
state action, because state authorization means that the private party is
acting "under the authority of state law."' 272 The court stated:
We cannot realistically conclude that, because the final act of dis-
crimination is undertaken by a private party motivated only by
personal economic or social considerations, we must close our eyes
and ears to the events which purport to make the final act legally
possible. Here the state has affirmatively acted to change its ex-
isting laws from a situation wherein the discrimination practiced
was legally restricted to one wherein it is encouraged, within the
meaning of the cited decisions. Certainly the act of which com-
plaint is made is as much if not more, the legislative action which
authorized private discrimination as it is the final, private act of
discrimination itself.
273
The United States Supreme Court affirmed Mulkey in Reitman v.
Mulkey.274 The Court observed that Proposition 14 "was intended to
authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing mar-
ket. The right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the
State. ,275
A decision to allow insurance companies to continue to use territo-
rial rating, with its attendant adverse impact on minorities and the poor,
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
271. Mulkey, 413 P.2d at 831.
272. Id. at 833.
273. Id. at 834.
274. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
275. Id. at 381.
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would be tantamount to the authorization of racial and economic dis-
crimination in the automobile insurance market.
The intent of Proposition 103 was to end territorial rating. This is
demonstrated by the legislative history of the measure. When an initia-
tive is passed by the voters, the ballot arguments contained in the voters'
pamphlet are the legislative history of the measure.276 In this instance,
the best evidence of the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 103
lies in the analysis by the Legislative Analyst and the arguments submit-
ted against the proposition. The summary of Proposition 103 prepared
by the Office of the Legislative Analyst said the following about the im-
pact of the measure on automobile insurance rates:
DETERMINING FACTORS FOR RATES. In general, the measure re-
quires that rates and premiums for automobile insurance be deter-
mined on the basis of the insured person's driving record, miles
driven and number of years of driving experience.277
The ballot argument submitted in rebuttal to the argument in favor of
Proposition 103, stated that "RATES WILL INCREASE by an average
22% for two thirds of the state's drivers, according to the State Depart-
ment of Insurance, because PROP 103 eliminates rating based on the
driving safety record of your neighborhood."'278 In the argument against
Proposition 103 contained in the voters' pamphlet, opponents contended
that "PROP 103 forces insurers to ignore the driving safety record of
where you live." 279 Certainly, the insurance industry campaign against
the initiative, outside of Los Angeles County, consistently informed vot-
ers that the initiative would raise their rates because it would eliminate
territorial rating.
280
Like the passage of Proposition 14, approval of territorial rating
would place the imprimatur of the Commissioner and the state of Cali-
276. In Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983), the supreme court remarked
that California courts construing an initiative measure often refer to the analysis and argu-
ments in the voters' pamphlet as an aid to ascertaining the intent of the framers and the
electorate. Id. at 865. The case of White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975) offers an excellent
example of the supreme court's use of this technique. In White, the supreme court was inter-
preting the newly enacted constitutional right to privacy, CAL. CONST. art. I, sec. 1, added to
the state constitution by Proposition 11. In construing that constitutional provision, the
supreme court relied heavily upon the election brochure arguments. The court noted that
"California decisions have long recognized the propriety of resorting to such election brochure
arguments as an aid in construing legislative measures and constitutional amendments adopted
pursuant to a vote of the people." 533 P.2d at 234 n. 11.
277. California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election, November 8, 1988, at 140.
278. Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 101.
280. Kenneth Reich, Insurers Seek to Keep Territorial Ratings, L.A. TiMEs, June 20, 1989,
at A3.
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fornia on a practice of the insurance industry that clearly discriminates
against racial minorities and the poor. Since Proposition 103 at mini-
mum prohibits the use of territorial rating without the approval of the
Insurance Commissioner, a decision approving the use of this rating fac-
tor would indeed encourage and condone a discriminatory practice. This
would constitute state action under the standard established in
Mulkey. 28' The complaint of the minorities and the poor adversely af-
fected by a decision to allow redlining will be as much with the Commis-
sioner's action as it will be with the industry's redlining practices.
B. A Decision To Allow the Use of Territorial Rating Should be
Reviewed under the Strict Scrutiny Standard
The California Supreme Court has adopted a two-tier analysis for
questions arising under the equal protection clauses of the California
Constitution.282 On the first tier, the state draws distinctions between
different groups of individuals, which do not touch on "fundamental in-
terests" or involve "suspect classifications." In those cases, the equal
protection clauses require that the classifications bear a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate public purpose.283 The second tier of cases are those
where the legislation or action by the state involves "suspect classifica-
tions" or touches on "fundamental interests.
'284
The right to drive is not considered "fundamental." 285 But redlin-
ing harms two suspect classes: racial minorities and the poor. Territorial
rating discriminates on the basis of geography, so those suspect classes
are not disadvantaged on the face of the policy. Moreover, there is no
hard proof that the insurance industry or the state harbor an invidious
purpose.286 So the first question is whether the strict scrutiny standard
281. Mulkey was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution.
While the United States Supreme Court has never overruled Mulkey, it is clear that the Court
has retreated from the broad implications of that holding. See, eg., Crawford v. Los Angeles
Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 538 (1982); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406, 414 (1977).
California is free to apply the principles and standards it announced in Mulkey under the
independent authority of the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution. See supra
notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
282. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7(a), 7(b); art. IV, § 16.
283. Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458 (Cal. 1984).
284. The test for imposition of strict scrutiny is stated in the alternative: strict scrutiny is
applied whenever a law or policy affects a fundamental interest or disadvantages a suspect
class. Id.
285. See infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
286. While proof of such invidious purpose is difficult to come by, many charge that it is
present. A study done by the New Jersey Department of Insurance acknowledged that base
rates there varied inversely with the gross income of the territory. While the report concluded
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should apply where the state policy has a disparate impact on suspect
classifications, but there is no proof that the state or the insurance indus-
try intend to engage in racial or economic discrimination.
1. Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities
287
The California Supreme Court began to develop a disparate impact
theory for cases involving racial discrimination under the state constitu-
tion in school desegregation cases. In these cases, the court held that the
state equal protection clauses dictate that state officials are not constitu-
tionally free to adopt a facially neutral policy if that policy has an actual,
differential impact on minority children. The court began developing
this standard in Jackson v. Pasadena City School District.28  In Jackson,
the trial court sustained a demurrer to a complaint alleging that the
Pasadena School District had gerrymandered junior high school bounda-
ries so that white students would not have to attend a junior high school
that had an enrollment with a high percentage of African-Americans and
other racial minorities.2"9 In reversing this ruling, the supreme court
held that even if the plaintiff could not prove intentional discrimination
by the school district, he might be entitled to relief:
[E]ven in the absence of gerrymandering or other affirmative dis-
criminatory conduct by a school board, a student under some cir-
cumstances would be entitled to relief where, by reason of
residential segregation, substantial racial imbalance exists at his
school.... Residential segregation is in itself an evil which tends
to frustrate the youth in the area and to cause antisocial attitudes
and behavior. Where such segregation exists it is not enough for a
that a case for a pattern of racial discrimination had not been made out, it acknowledged "the
possibility of territorial boundaries doing the work of suspect or unlawful criteria." NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICA-
TIONS AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES: FINAL DETERMINATION-MAJOR FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS 45 (1981). See also Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Casualty Co.,
472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders, Part 1:
Discrimination by Property and Casualty Insurance Companies: The Fairness in the Coverage
and Cost of Insurance: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and
Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 223-351, 352-409, 410-
51, 452-87, 634-748 (1978); In the Matter of the Public Hearings of the Insurance Commis-
sioner Relating to Automobile Insurance-Territorial Classifications-Effect on Rates, RH 207.
One commentator has recognized the force of these allegations: "When territory of resi-
dence functions as a close surrogate for race in automobile insurance, differential treatment on
the basis of race has been symbolically eliminated, but for many persons the disparate treatment
continues in fact through the use of territorial variables." Abraham, supra note 102, at 443
(emphasis added).
287. Race is the original "suspect classification." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964).
288. 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963).
289. Id. at 879-80.
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school board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory con-
duct.... The right to an equal opportunity for education and the
harmful consequences of segregation require that school boards
take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbal-
ance in schools regardless of its cause.290
In the second case, Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los
Angeles,29 t the court reviewed a trial court's ruling that the Los Angeles
Unified School District was segregated. The trial court specifically found
that the Board of Education had, since at least 1963, segregated its stu-
dents de jure.2 92 On appeal, the defendants argued that the segregation
that existed was de facto.293 On that basis the defendants asserted that
they had no constitutional obligation to remedy the situation.
294
The supreme court rejected this argument. It observed that while
maintenance of a neighborhood school policy might, on its face, appear
neutral, the effect of such schemes is invariably to inflict a racially spe-
cific harm on minority students when such policies result in segregated
education.295 The court quoted several studies noting that the harm as-
sociated with a segregated education occurred whether the segregation
was de jure or de facto. 296 Based on these conclusions, the court held
that a school board is not free to adopt facially neutral policies where
those policies have an "actual differential impact on the minority chil-
dren in its schools. ' 2 97 The court based this ruling entirely on the equal
protection clauses of the California Constitution.298
290. Id. at 881-82. The court held that improper discrimination exists even where some
white children attend predominantly black schools and vice versa. Id. at 881. The court
quoted the Jackson opinion with approval in San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 479
P.2d 669, 682 (Cal. 1971).
291. 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
292. Id. at 30. De jure segregation has been described as "segregation specifically man-
dated by law or by public policy pursued under color of law." Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 493 (D.C. 1967). John W. Hanley, Jr., Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1. Unlock-
ing the Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 124 (1974).
293. Crawford, 551 P.2d at 33. De facto segregation has been defined as "racial imbalance
resulting merely from adherence to the traditional, racially neutral, neighborhood school pol-
icy in a community marked by racially segregated residential patterns." Frank I. Goodman,
De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275
(1972).
294. Crawford, 551 P.2d at 33.
295. Id. at 34.
296. Id. at 37.
297. Id. at 38. The court cited with approval People v. Superior Court (Dean), 113 Cal.
Rptr. 732, 736 (1974), and People v. Spears, 122 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1975). Dean and Spears are jury
selection cases that hold that state officials have an affirmative obligation to develop rules and
procedures that prevent discrimination. Crawford, 551 P.2d at 38.
298. Before Crawford was decided, the California Supreme Court's school desegregation
opinions were not based on the California Constitution. The court was convinced that the
United States Supreme Court would reject the dejure/de facto distinction. By the time Craw-
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The development of this line of analysis in California courts was
impeded by the passage of Proposition 1 in 1979. Proposition 1 amended
Article I, section 7 of the California Constitution so that its provisions
must be read parallel with the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution with respect to the assignment of students for pur-
poses of school desegregation.2 99 The result of the enactment of that
constitutional amendment was that mandatory pupil reassignment (bus-
ing) may only be required where there is a finding of de jure discrimina-
tion."c° This effectively overruled the line of cases stating that the de
jure/de facto distinction was meaningless under the California Constitu-
tion for cases involving busing.
Proposition 1 did not, however, abrogate the principle that the Cali-
fornia Constitution imposes a duty on school officials to remedy segrega-
tion whether that discrimination is de facto or de jure. McKinny v. Board
of Trustees, a school desegregation case, was decided after the enactment
of Proposition 1. °11 One issue before the court was how the passage of
Proposition 1 affected its decision in Crawford. The court concluded that
the amendment merely conformed the School Board's obligations with
respect to busing to the duties imposed by the federal constitution. The
court emphatically stated that this was the only change wrought by the
constitutional amendment:
However, the amendment neither releases school districts from
their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible
ford was decided, it seemed reasonably clear that the United States Supreme Court would
employ the de facto/de jure distinction. See Crawford, 551 P.2d at 33-34 n.4. Ultimately, of
course, the United Supreme Court did adopt that distinction. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977). As a result, in Crawford the California Supreme Court explic-
itly based its ruling on the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution. Crawford,
551 P.2d at 35.
Article I, section 24 was added to the state constitution in 1974. It provides that "rights
guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent upon those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution." The California courts have subsequently relied upon Article I, section 24 of the
California Constitution as an additional source of the independent vitality of the state constitu-
tional guarantees. See eg., People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1114 (Cal. 1975); People v.
Morgan, 150 Cal. Rptr. 712, 720 (Ct. App. 1978).
299. The language of Article I, section 7 relevant to this discussion states:
A person may not be ... denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing
contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of Califor-
nia or any public entity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which
exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil
transportation.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
300. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 497-98 (Ct.
App. 1980).
301. 642 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1982).
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steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests
California courts of authority to order desegregation measures
other than pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.3 °2
In Jackson and Crawford, the court held that adoption of "neutral"
policies are unconstitutional when they have an actual differential impact
on minority children.3 °3 In effect, the court ruled that the adoption of
such measures involves the suspect classification of race.3
Jackson and Crawford demonstrate that a decision by the Insurance
Commissioner to reinstate territorial rating should be subjected to strict
scrutiny. First, territorial rating, unlike a decision to adopt a policy of
neighborhood schools, is not a "neutral" policy. Territorial rating is a
policy that on its face countenances discrimination. It allows insurers to
charge different rates to drivers with exactly the same driving character-
istics, owning exactly the same automobile. Those markedly different
rates are based solely on a characteristic that bears no relationship to
individual responsibility. 305 Territorial rating is discrimination that runs
afoul of the constitutional principle that burdens imposed by law should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
30 6
That alone is enough, when coupled with the adverse impact of territorial
rating on racial minorities, to require strict scrutiny.
Even if one accepts, for purposes of argument, that territorial rating
could be construed as a "neutral" policy, studies done by the Depart-
ment of Insurance amply demonstrate that the practice has an actual,
differential, and adverse impact on racial minorities. Residents of Oak-
land, Compton, and South Central Los Angeles, as well as communities
in Berkeley largely populated by racial minorities, currently pay substan-
tially more for automobile insurance than they would pay if they lived in
nearby predominantly white and relatively affluent neighborhoods.30 7
Thus, if the Insurance Commissioner were to approve of territorial rat-
ing, he would be lending the imprimatur of the state to a practice that
adversely affects a suspect class, people of color. Based on the Jack-
302. Id. at 467.
303. Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist, 382 P.2d 878, 880-81 (Cal. 1963); Crawford, 551
P.2d at 30.
304. The court held in Jackson and Crawford that the defendants had violated the Equal
Protection Clauses, of the United States Constitution in Jackson, and the California Constitu-
tion in Crawford. Perhaps due to the clear mandate that existed for desegregation of the
schools, the court did not discuss, in either case, what level of scrutiny it was applying in
reviewing the actions of the defendants.
305. See supra Part I.A.
306. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). See supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 16-39 and accompanying text.
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son/Crawford analysis, that decision should be subjected to strict scru-
tiny review.
There are two potential objections to the argument that the Jack-
son/Crawford analysis requires use of strict scrutiny to assess the consti-
tutionality of territorial rating. The first is that it is inappropriate to
apply standards developed in cases involving education to a problem in-
volving the right to drive a car. In California, education is recognized as
a fundamental interest of the highest order.3 °8 While the California
courts have held that the right to drive is an important interest that af-
fects the economic well-being of the state's citizens, they have refused to
hold that it is a fundamental interest for equal protection purposes. In
Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles, °9 the California Supreme
Court observed that:
In our present travel-oriented society, the retention of a driver's
license is an important right to every person who has obtained such
a license.... Whether a driver's license is required only for deliv-
ering bread, commuting to work, transporting children or the eld-
erly, meeting medical appointments, attending social or political
functions, or any combination of these or other purposes, the revo-
cation or suspension of that license, even for a six month period,
can and often does constitute a severe personal and economic
hardship.
310
Because of the importance of the right to drive, the California Supreme
Court has held that, under the Due Process Clauses of the United States
and California Constitutions, a decision to revoke or suspend a driver's
license is subject to independent review. 311  Nevertheless, the state
supreme court has made it clear that statutes affecting the right to drive
will not be subjected to strict scrutiny, because the right is not "funda-
mental," as that term is used in equal protection analysis.3 12
Although the right to drive is not a "fundamental" right, a decision
to allow the use of territory as a rating factor should be reviewed under
the strict scrutiny standard. The test for applying strict scrutiny is stated
in the alternative: strict scrutiny is required whenever a state law or pol-
icy affects a fundamental interest or affects a suspect classification.313
308. In Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), the California Supreme Court elo-
quently discussed the myriad reasons for its conclusion that education is a fundamental inter-
est. Ia at 1255-59.
309. 657 P.2d 383 (Cal. 1983).
310. Id at 387.
311. Id
312. Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 634 P.2d 917, 922 (Cal. 1981); Perkey v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 721 P.2d 50, 52 (Cal. 1986). Thus it would appear that redlin-
ing does not impinge on a fundamental interest.
313. Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 469 (Cal. 1984).
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Since territorial rating disadvantages a suspect classification-racial mi-
norities3 14--that alone is sufficient to require review under the strict scru-
tiny standard. When redlining's adverse impact on racial minorities is
combined with the fact that failure to buy automobile insurance can lead
to the loss of the important right to drive,315 it can be argued convinc-
ingly that a decision to reinstate territorial rating must be examined
under the most exacting constitutional standard.
Hardy v. Stumpf"' raises a second argument against applying strict
scrutiny because of territorial rating's disparate impact on minorities. In
Hardy, the plaintiff was a woman who wanted to be a police officer. The
City of Oakland required all candidates to pass a strength and agility
test, which the plaintiff failed.317 She argued that since the test disquali-
fied a disproportionate number of female applicants,31 it should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny.3 19 The California Supreme Court rejected this
contention, holding that disproportionate impact, standing alone, does
not trigger the rule that gender or racial classifications are subjected to
strict scrutiny.32°
The Hardy court concluded that the physical agility and strength
test being challenged was neutral on its face.321 The court's holding in
Hardy that proof of disproportionate impact alone was insufficient to in-
voke strict scrutiny was based on this finding of neutrality.2
The distinction between the situation in Hardy and the problem of
territorial rating resides in the word "neutral." As explained before, ter-
ritorial rating is not a "neutral" practice.3 23 Territorial rating explicitly
discriminates, and does so without regard to individual responsibility.
324
Since territorial rating is not a "neutral" practice, the holding in Hardy
314. See supra Part I.A.
315. See supra Part I.B.
316. 576 P.2d 1342 (Cal. 1978).
317. Id. at 1343-44.
318. Plaintiff proved that a disproportionate number of women were unable to pass one
aspect of the test. Id. at 1344.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1345.
321. Id. at 1344.
322. Id
323. See Part I.A.
324. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. There is a second distinction between
Hardy and the problem of redlining. Ms. Hardy could attempt to overcome her disqualifica-
tion by practicing wall scaling and improving her skills. Indeed, the supreme court noted that
Ms. Hardy passed the wall scaling test after she failed the agility examination, and that she
could retake the physical agility test in four months. Hardy, 576 P.2d at 1344 n.1.
The victims of redlining cannot obtain lower rates by improving their driving skills. Be-
cause rates are determined by where drivers live, drivers in redlined areas are condemned to
high rates by their neighborhoods alone.
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should not immunize a decision to reinstate territorial rating from review
under the strict scrutiny standard.
2 Disparate Impact on the Poor
In Serrano v. Priest,32 the California Supreme Court held that
wealth is a suspect classification. The court agreed with the sentiment
expressed by the United States Supreme Court that "a careful examina-
tion on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the
basis of wealth... [a] factor which would independently render a classifi-
cation highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scru-
tiny." 326 Based in part on that conclusion, the supreme court found that
California's geographic system for financing public education discrimi-
nated on the basis of wealth.
Carefully considered, the facts presented in Serrano demonstrate
that it is best understood as a disparate impact case, even though the
supreme court never mentions the term. In Serrano, the plaintiffs were
challenging the constitutionality of California's school financing system.
California's statutory system allocated resources on a territorial basis
through the designation of local school districts, each with an individual
and unique tax base.327
The defendants raised several contentions in defense of this system.
One was that the classification was constitutional as long as it was based
on the wealth of the district, not of the individual.3 28 The court rejected
that contention, holding that discrimination on the basis of district
wealth is also invalid. The court declared that to make the quality of a
child's education dependent on the fortuitous distribution of commercial
property is an irrelevant basis for educational financing.
3 29
The Serrano defendants also argued that the system was constitu-
tional because the discrimination was unintentional, or de facto. 330 The
first Serrano opinion specifically rejected this contention:
[T]his Court held eight years ago such [de facto] discrimination
invalid, and declared that school boards should undertake affirma-
tive steps to alleviate racial imbalance, however created. Conse-
quently, any discrimination based on wealth can hardly be
vindicated by reference to de facto racial segregation, which we
have already condemned. In sum, we are of the view that the
325. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
326. Id. at 1250 (quoting McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)).
327. Id at 1246.
328. IAd at 1250-51.
329. Id at 1252-53.
330. Id at 1253.
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school financing system discriminates upon the basis of the wealth
of a district and its residents.331
The supreme court remanded the case to the superior court for fur-
ther proceedings. 332 A full trial was held on the allegations made by the
plaintiffs. While the case was pending, the California Legislature made
substantial changes in the laws governing school financing in an effort to
respond to some of the plaintiffs' complaints.
333
The trial court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of
law. It determined that while the changes instituted by the legislature did
ameliorate some of the disparities in per pupil expenditures, it did not
eliminate those disparities.334 Based on this finding, the trial court deter-
mined that the school financing system continued to discriminate on the
basis of wealth. For that reason, the trial court held that the school fi-
nancing system violated the equal protection provisions of the state
constitution.335
In Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1)336 the California Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's ruling. The supreme court agreed with the trial
court's conclusion that the school financing system discriminated on the
basis of district wealth. 337 The court acknowledged that San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez338 invalidated its earlier conclu-
sion that wealth was a suspect classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 39 In response, the court held that wealth is a suspect clas-
sification under the equal protection clauses of the California Constitu-
tion.3 4° Since the school financing scheme affected a suspect classification
331. Id. at 1255 (citations omitted).
332. Id. at 1266. The case had come before the supreme court after the trial court sustained
demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend. Id at 1245.
333. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 931-32, 935-56 (Cal. 1976) (en bane) (Serrano II).
334. The trial court found, among other things, that poorer districts continued to have to
tax themselves at higher levels than did wealthy districts in order to obtain the same level of
service for their students, and that, to the extent that the state system continued to rely upon
local property taxes to finance part of the schools, district wealth continued to determine what
kind of education a child would receive. Id. at 939 n.20.
335. Id. at 939.
336. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
337. The high court agreed with the trial court that the changes made in the school financ-
ing system by the Legislature, while a marked improvement, did not render the system accept-
able under the state's equal protection clauses. Id. at 957-58.
338. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
339. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951. In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court decided
that wealth is not a suspect classification under the federal constitution. 411 U.S. at 28-29.
340. The California Supreme Court based its conclusion that wealth is a suspect classifica-
tion on the independent vitality of the state equal protection provisions. Serrano II, 557 P.2d
at 951.
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and involved a fundamental interest,341 it was subjected to strict scru-
tiny.342 The court declared the scheme unconstitutional because it did
not serve a compelling state interest.
343
The statistics collected by the California Department of Insurance
prove that territorial rating causes residents of the poorest areas of this
state's major metropolitan areas to pay the highest rates in the state for
automobile insurance. 3' Like the school financing scheme under fire in
Serrano, territorial rating promotes line-drawing on the basis of wealth,
and has a proven adverse impact on the poor. Because the Serrano opin-
ion declares that such line-drawing independently renders a classification
highly suspect,345 a decision to reinstate territorial rating should be re-
viewed using strict scrutiny.3 "
C. A Decision to Permit Territorial Rating Would Not Survive Strict
Scrutiny
L The State Has a Compelling Interest in Making Automobile Insurance
Available
The California Supreme Court has treated measures that disadvan-
tage a "suspect class" as presumptively invidious.3 47 The court enforces
the mandate of equal protection in those cases by requiring the state to
demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state interest that
341. The supreme court also declared that education is a fundamental interest under the
state constitution. The court relied upon the equal protection clauses of the state constitution,
and three of its sections that specifically control the provision and financing of public educa-
tion. Id at 950 n.42.
342. The court hedged on declaring wealth a full fledged "suspect classification." It stated
that it was not holding that all cases involving governmental classifications based upon wealth
warranted strict scrutiny review. Instead, the court declared that the combination of wealth
discrimination affecting education, a fundamental interest, required strict scrutiny under the
California Constitution. IdL at 951 n.45. It should be noted that the court has held on at least
one other occasion that discrimination based upon poverty invokes strict scrutiny. In re
Antazo, 473 P.2d 999, 1000 (Cal. 1970) (en banc). See also Committee to Defend Reprod.
Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (Cal. 1981) (stating that the indigent poor share many
characteristics of other "insular minorities" who may not be adequately protected from dis-
criminatory treatment).
343. Serrano I, 557 P.2d 953.
344. See supra Part I.A.
345. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (Cal. 1971).
346. This is especially true because territorial rating could cause residents of inner cities to
lose their driving privileges. While the right to drive is not fundamental, it is an important
right that is deserving of constitutional protection from arbitrary termination. See supra notes
309-12 and accompanying text.
The combination of redlining's potential effect on the important right drive with its effect
on the suspect classifications of race and wealth should subject a decision to reinstate territorial
rating to strict scrutiny review.
347. Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 470 (Cal. 1984).
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justifies the law. 48
The state should make insurance available to all who need or desire
it. Often, the purchase of insurance is required by lenders as a condition
for obtaining loans.34 9 In other instances, the individual's personal cir-
cumstances require the purchase of insurance as a hedge against poten-
tially disastrous personal liability claims or losses.350 In this context, the
United States Supreme Court recognized in 1914 that insurance is, in
many cases, a necessity.
3 5 1
The state is a beneficiary of an efficient insurance system. Insurance
reduces the cost to the public fisc of the losses caused by accidents.35 2 To
protect the state's interest in the insurance system, the Insurance Code
contains extensive statutory protection against insurer insolvency.53 The
state also has created a safety net to protect consumers when insurers
become insolvent or appear to be on the verge of insolvency.354 The exist-
ence of these mechanisms demonstrates the depth of the state's interest in
guarding the solvency of insurers.
Finally, the enactment of statutes that mandate the purchase of au-
tomobile liability insurance imposes on the state a due process obligation
to make that insurance available at rates that are neither arbitrary nor
capricious.355
Allowing insurers to set rates on the basis of group classifications is
generally defended on the ground that this is the best method available
for spreading risk in a manner that allows insurers to set rates and make
a reasonable profit.35 6 It is said that while it would be ideal to set each
individual's rates on the basis of her own personal characteristics, it is
not possible or it is too expensive to collect the data necessary to allow
348. Id. at 94.
349. CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85, at 7. See also OFFCE OF THE FEDERAL
INSURANCE ADMINISTRATOR, INSURANCE CRISIS IN AMERICA (1977), in Rights and Reme-
dies of Insurance Policyholders, supra note 286.
350. Wortham, supra note 193, at 395.
351. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389,414 (1914). The Court was speak-
ing of fire insurance in that case.
352. Id at 413.
353. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
354. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1010-1065 (West Supp. 1991).
355. King v. Meese, 743 P.2d 889, 897 (Cal. 1987). See supra notes 149-50.
356. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE - TERRITORIAL CLASSIFICATIONS - EFFECT ON RATES,
RH 207, 8-9 (California Insurance Commissioner 1979); STATE RATING BUREAU, MASSA-
CHUSETrs DIVISION OF INSURANCE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RISK CLASSIFICATION: EQ-
USTY & ACCURACY, at 2-3 (1978); Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders, 1978:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 106 (1978) (Prepared
Statement on Behalf of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners).
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individualized rate setting.357 Accepting that premise as true, it follows
that allowing insurers to set rates based on membership in some manner
of classification probably serves the state's compelling interest in keeping
the state's insurers solvent so that automobile liability insurance is
available.
2 The State Must Show that Territorial Rating Is Necessary to Advance
the State Interest in Making Automobile Insurance Available
While the state can show that maintaining insurer insolvency is a
compelling interest, the second prong of the strict scrutiny test is not so
easily satisfied. Where a statute affects suspect classifications, the state
bears the burden of proving that the distinctions drawn by the law are
necessary to further the state's purpose.358 Even if a measure affecting
suspect classifications is deemed "necessary," it must be precisely tai-
lored to serve the state's compelling governmental interest.359 If there
are less restrictive alternatives available, a statute will not survive strict
scrutiny.
36°
357. One commentator wrote of this issue:
The need to make allowance for competent operation was recognized early, but
the problem has defied solution; human qualities, the best possible basis for rating,
are impossible to evaluate accurately. The entire history of auto liability insurance
rate making has been the search for bases of rating which would parallel the unat-
tainable goal of measuring individual driver's abilities and habits."
H. JEROME ZOFFER, THE HISTORY OF AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE RATING 14
(1959).
Another observer concluded that:
Perfect risk assessment by rating would accurately predict the risk any individual
represents. But because most people have too few accidents to establish their
probability of loss - even after many years of driving - such prediction is
impossible.
STATE RATING BUREAU, MASSACHUSETTS DIvIsION OF INSURANCE, AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE RISK CLASSIFICATION: EQUITY AND ACCURACY, at 2 (1978).
And the National Association of Insurance Commissioners informed Congress that:
Ideally, individual risk would be scrutinized and weighed like a commodity to price
each buyer with precise accuracy according to the buyer's true loss potential ....
Unfortunately, the best a supplier of insurance can do for small risks is to establish a
class price for a class of similar risks based upon average experience ....
Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders, 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citi-
zens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Comm on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 107 (1978) (Prepared Statement on Behalf of the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners).
358. Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 473 (Cal. 1984); In re Antazo, 473 P.2d 999, 1005
(Cal. 1970).
359. Darces, 679 P.2d at 473.
360. Payne v. Superior Court, 553 P.2d 565, 570 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
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3. The Use of Territorial Rating Is Not "Necessary"
The use of territorial rating is not "necessary" to further the state's
interest in maintaining insurer solvency. Robert Hunter, a former actu-
ary and then the Deputy Federal Insurance Administrator3 6 testified
before Congress that any system of rating criteria can be made "actuari-
ally sound.' 362 Defining the term to mean achieving a reasonable profit
for insurers, Hunter stated that an insurer could eliminate age, sex, and
even territory, take a map of a state, compile the number of dollars it
wanted to generate, and create a plan that was "actuarially sound" using
merit rating criteria. 363 Since alternatives are available that would allow
insurers to create appropriate classes and write insurance profitably,
364
the need to create group classifications does not render territorial rating
necessary.
Insurers contend that approval of territorial rating is required be-
cause it is "actuarially sound." This contention is based on the language
of California Insurance Code section 1861.05(a), which provides "No
rate shall be approved or remain in effect which is excessive, inadequate,
unfairly discriminatory .... "
Even if this contention is correct,365 the statutory language cannot
override the mandate of the California Constitution that burdens im-
posed by the law bear some relationship with individual responsibility.
366
In Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r,367 insurers
contended that similar language in the Pennsylvania Casualty and Surety
Rate Regulation Act required the Insurance Commissioner to approve
the use of gender-based rating criteria if the insurers could support the
rates with actuarial data.368 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected
that contention, holding that the equal rights amendment to the Penn-
sylvania Constitution allowed the Insurance Commissioner to reject gen-
der-based classifications despite their statistical relationship to risk of
361. Mr. Hunter is now the Director of the National Insurance Consumers Coalition.
362. Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders, 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 219 (1978) (testimony of Robert Hunter, Deputy Federal
Insurance Administrator, Department of Housing and Urban Development).
363. Id See also Opinion, Findings and Decision on 1978 Automobile Insurance Rates, id, at
521. (James Stone, Commissioner of Insurance, Massachusetts).
364. See infra Part IV.
365. There is substantial evidence to suggest that this language was never intended to re-
quire certain forms of classification. Wortham, supra note 193, at 381-393.
366. Darces, 679 P.2d 458, 474 (Cal. 1984).
367. 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984).
368. Id. at 546.
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loss. The court relied, in part, on this observation of the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners:
[P]ublic policy... require[s] more adequate justification for rating
factors than simple statistical correlation with loss; in this regard
the task force recommends consideration of criteria such as causal-
ity, reliability, social acceptability, and incentive value in judging
the reasonableness of a classification system.369
Nor is the selection of territory as a rating classification mandated
by scientific or actuarial principles.370 The choice of rating classifications
is in part a marketing device used by insurers to attract desirable policy-
holders and discourage undesirable potential policyholders.37 Indeed,
the popularity of territorial rating may be explained, in part, by its ability
to discourage urban drivers, who are generally people of color and poor,
from purchasing insurance.3 72 Its popularity may also be attributable to
the prejudices and stereotypes held by those making rating decisions.
373
369. led at 548.
370. Professor Abraham put the proposition succinctly: "[Tihere is nothing special or pre-
ordained about the classifications that turn out to be efficient." Abraham, supra note 102, at
423. He makes the point that economics prevent insurers from experimenting with new classi-
fications. No individual insurer will restructure its rates because of the costs involved in col-
lecting and analyzing the data for the new classification. Competitors would take advantage of
the new classification without incurring the cost of developing the system and the data to
support it. Thus, Abraham argues, it will require collective action for innovation to occur. Id
In this case, the innovation would occur if the Insurance Commissioner ordered an end to
territorial rating. The New Jersey Department of Insurance also commented on the lack of
scientific basis for many insurance classifications:
Choices of classification variables were more the product of competitive pressures
than of any scientific effort to identify the full range of differences in risk among
insureds. Selection among numerous alternatives was largely a matter of judgment
... industry witnesses cannot produce a single traffic or population study, field obser-
vation, or other systematic study of any kind relating to the establishment of existing
territorial boundaries. Efforts to explore with industry witnesses the thinking behind
specific choices of variables were largely met with disclaimers of any direct or de-
tailed information.
HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATION, supra note 17, at 5. See also, Au-
TOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE CLASSIFICATION, supra note 117, at 6.
371. Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 517,
535; AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE CLASSIFICATION, supra note 370, at 7, 8-9, 11; See also
CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85, at 13.
372. The Stanford Research Institute noted that it found an inverse relationship between
wealth and the amounts charged in rating territories in urban/suburban areas:
Territorial classifications show that disposable income is the highest on the aver-
age in medium rated territories, typically the suburban territories, and drops signifi-
cantly both for the lowest rated territories (rural areas) and the highest rated
territories (inner city areas).
CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85, at 97.
373. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE CLASSIFICATION, supra note 117, at 6, 8. That such
assumptions and stereotypes might contribute to the making of rate classifications is vividly
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While territorial rating may be profitable for insurers, its use is not
required by statute or by principles of sound insurance rating policy. In
short, the use of territory is not necessary to effectuate the state's compel-
ling interest.374
The insurance industry objects that the loss of territorial rating
would result in a "subsidy" to urban drivers.375 The fact that a subsidy
might be created for urban drivers does not provide a compelling reason
for the state to sanction continuation of a rating practice that discrimi-
nates against minorities and the poor. In a sense, all insurance classifica-
tions create subsidies, to the extent that they group poorer risks with
better risks. 376 The New Jersey Department of Insurance concluded that
because of the inaccuracies inherent in territorial rating, the subsidy in
many cases runs from the good urban driver to poor risks living in subur-
ban and rural areas:
Direct assessment of the expected claims of individuals within each
territory indicates an alarming frequency and magnitude of pricing
errors in the higher rated territories. In the highest rated territory,
for example, 35% of the adult base class is overcharged at least
$300.00 in relation to... expected costs for full coverage; 15% of
illustrated in the SRI study of automobile insurance rate classification. It quotes an insurance
executive defending high inner city rates. The executive stated:
I used to live in one of those congested Chicago areas... and I can tell you that the
higher insurance rates were primarily a homegrown phenomenon, the product of too
little off-street parking, narrow streets designed for an earlier era, verv aggressive driv-
ing habits due in part to tensions among ethic [sic] groups, high alcohol consumption
among both drivers and pedestrians, a high level of claims consciousness ....
CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85, at 60-61 (emphasis added). The SRI study ac-
knowledged that many beliefs widely held by the insurance industry having little foundation in
fact may be reflected in the availability and price of premiums. Id. at 31.
374. That insurers make money by using territorial rating, or that it will cost money to
devise new classifications does not mean that territorial rating is "necessary" under the Cali-
fornia Constitution. Proof that the use of suspect classifications results in administrative con-
venience or cost savings does not satisfy the necessity requirement. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 636-38 (1969); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 267-69 (1974);
Boren v. Department of Employment Dev., 130 Cal. Rptr. 683, 689-90 (Ct. App. 1976).
375. Typical of the industry position is this quotation from Lowell Beck, the president of
the National Association of Independent Insurers:
While "the promoters of these initiatives [referring to Proposition 103] promise rate
cuts and talk about competition and fairness, in reality they are talking about a hid-
den subsidy system .... That system takes money from good risks and uses that
money to reduce the rates of higher risks or those who function in high risk areas
Kathryn J. McIntyre, Industry Stresses Fairness, Respect: Beck, BUSINESS INSURANCE, No-
vember 20, 1989, at 91 (emphasis added). A spokesman for the American Insurance Industry
claimed that proposals under Proposition 103 to eliminate the use of territory produce "unfair
subsidies." AIA To Unveil California Auto Rate Program, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER-PROP-
ERTY AND CASUALTY, November 27, 1989, at 6.
376. Abraham, supra note 102, at 422.
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these adults are overcharged at least $500.00. 377
The question is how those inevitable subsidies are to be distrib-
uted.1 8 As the United States Supreme Court observed in Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power v. Manhart:
379
[W]hen insurance risks are grouped, the better risks always subsi-
dize the poorer risks .... Treating different classes of risks as
though they were the same for purposes of group insurance is a
common practice which has never been considered inherently un-
fair. To insure the flabby and the fit as though they were
equivalent risks may be more common than treating men and wo-
men alike; but nothing more than habit makes one "subsidy" seem
less fair than the other.38°
No insurer can prove that automobile liability insurance cannot be
written prudently without resort to territorial rating. It is merely the
habit, of insurers and of society as a whole, of penalizing minorities and
the poor that makes the subsidy created by territorial rating acceptable.
There is no compelling reason for the state to allow that practice to con-
tinue, because there are adequate alternative rating classifications
available.381
377. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE CLASSIFICATION, supra note 117, at 18-19.
378. This point was noted by the Massachusetts study of the problem of classification in
automobile insurance rating. None of the rating criteria used in automobile insurance rating
fared particularly well in predicting risk of loss. Thus the Massachusetts Division of Insurance
concluded that:
mhe decision of whether to retain, remove or institute a particular variable will
depend upon the relative weight given to the variable's performance with respect to
each criterion.... The choice made will differ depending upon which trade-offs are
considered reasonable. It is important to recognize that such trade.offs cannot be
avoided in selecting a classification scheme
EQurry & ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 2-6, 21 (emphasis added).
379. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
380. Id. at 710. Even those experts sympathetic to the arguments of the insurance industry
concur that the use of territory involves a "subsidy." Thus the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners, whose testimony generally favored the continued use of territorial rating,
informed Congress that:
[A] pure merit-rating system might impose an intolerable burden on those who are
unfortunate enough to have accidents. The present system, by putting drivers in dif-
ferent groups with separate classifications, tempers loss experience and makes itfeasi-
ble for drivers with accident records to obtain insurance at prices which are not
prohibitive.
Rights and Remedies of Insurance Policyholders, supra note 286, at 108 (Prepared Statement
on Behalf of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners) (emphasis added).
381. See infra notes 382-88, and accompanying text.
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IV. A Proposed Solution to the Automobile Insurance Rating
Dilemma
A. A System for Evaluating the Constitutionality of Rating Criteria
There is an inherent tension between the equal protection ideal that
burdens imposed bear some relationship to individual responsibility
3 2
and insurers' need to place drivers in categories that bear some relation
to the risk of loss presented. 313 If territorial rating is eliminated, 384 insur-
ers will need alternative classifications for grouping risks that conform to
the constitutional ideal.
Professor Leah Wortham has proposed a useful analytical system
for evaluating rating criteria which strikes an appropriate balance be-
tween the insurers' need for categories that accurately predict risk of loss
and the constitutional and social imperative of equal treatment. Wor-
tham has suggested that rating classifications should be evaluated using
the following criteria:
(1) The statistical power of the characteristic's prediction of loss;
(2) The degree of statistical separation of the grouping of insureds
from the remainder of the insured population, which results from use of
the category;
385
(3) Whether the characteristic's relation to loss can be supported by
a persuasive causal explanation;
386
382. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), supra note 8 and ac-
companying text.
383. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
384. Territorial rating could be substantially modified to reduce its discriminatory racial
and economic impact within urban areas. One solution suggested by former Insurance Com-
missioner Gillespie would have created "regional territories." Memorandum from Roxani
Gillespie, Insurance Commissioner (August 1989) Chart 2. This proposal would alleviate the
most egregious aspect of territorial rating: It would eliminate insurers' ability to isolate territo-
ries on the basis of their racial composition and then charge those territories the highest rates
within a geographical area. This change would not, however, eliminate the racial impact of
territorial rating. As Justice Broussard observed, part of the racial impact of territorial rating
is due to the fact the lowest rates in the state are charged in rural areas, where few people of
color reside. King v. Meese, 745 P.2d 889, 902 n.8 (1987) (Broussard, J., concurring). That
impact would remain.
The racial and economic impact of territorial rating would be further ameliorated if the
Commissioner moved towards the Massachusetts/New Jersey model of "tempering" the im-
pact of territory on rates. See supra note 117.
385. "Separation" measures the degree to which insureds in different risk classes have dif-
ferent expected losses. Abraham, supra note 102, at 410; EQUITY AND AccuRAcy, supra note
117, at 3.
386. The inquiry is whether there is a direct causal connection betmeen the criterion used
and the likelihood of accident. An example of poor causal explanation is provided by the use
of gender as a rating factor. While gender does have a high degree of predictive power and
separation (i.e. statistics show that males tend to have more automobile accidents than fe-
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(4) The degree of incentive for reduction in the number or cost of
losses created by the use of the characteristic in rating;3 7
(5) The degree to which the classification is controllable by individ-
ual insureds;
(6) The compatibility of the use of the characteristic with widely
held social values; and
(7) The alternatives to private insurance available to potential in-
sureds who cannot purchase the concerned coverage.388
L Territorial Rating
Territorial rating seems to be a valid predictor of 1oss38 9-although
its performance in that category is not overwhelming.390 It fares badly
on the rest of the Wortham criteria. The degree of separation for territo-
rial rating is poor, particularly in high-rated territories.391 The connec-
tion between the place where an automobile is garaged and the risk of
loss is not supported, for the most part, by a persuasive causal explana-
tion.392 Territory is actually a surrogate for a complex of factors that
contribute to the risk of lOSS.3 93 While the location where an automobile
is garaged does have some gross causal relationship to the risk of loss,
394
the strength of that relationship has been found to be minimal.3 95 Terri-
males), the gender of the drivers does not cause the accidents. EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra
note 117, at 10.
387. One objective of insurance rating is to create incentives to halt or modify the behavior
which causes accidents. Id at 6; CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85, at 89. This
criterion assumes that rating characteristics should encourage drivers to modify behavior that
results in their placement in higher rating categories.
388. Wortham, supra note 193, at 417-18.
389. The available data suggest that territory is a valid statistical predictor of loss. Memo-
randum from the California Insurance Commissioner, accompanying Proposed Regulations on
Private Passenger Automobile Rating Factors 2 (December 5, 1989); CALIFORNIA DEPART-
MENT OF INSURANCE, RATE REGULATION DIVISION, STUDY OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING PER-
FORMANCE BY ZIP CODE (Phase II) 210 (1978); CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85,
at 49.
390. While the SRI study concluded that insurers should be able to use territory as a rating
criterion, it acknowledged that territory could explain only seven percent of the risk of loss.
Other rating criteria perform as poorly. CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85, at 49
(1976).
391. EQUITY AND ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 14-15.
392. As noted earlier, even the advocates of territorial rating acknowledge that neighbor-
hoods do not cause accidents. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 156.
394. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS AND RELATED METHODOLOGIES 44-52
(New Jersey Department of Insurance 1981) (Final determination).
395. Id.
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tory provides no incentive to reduce loss costs, 396 and because of patterns
of housing segregation and economic limitations, it is not controllable by
most insureds who live in redlined communities.39 7 Territorial rating is
completely incompatible with the constitutional value that burdens
should be borne according to individual responsibility.3 98 Although
there is an alternative to private insurance available to those adversely
affected by redlining-assigned risk coverage-its rates are also set using
territory as the primary rating factor.3 99
2. The Proposition 103 Rating Factors
Using Professor Wortham's criteria, it is apparent that two of the
three primary rating factors specified by Proposition 103 perform well.
The first factor identified by Proposition 103 is the insured's driving
safety record.' Driving safety record has strong predictive power."
The relationship to loss can be explained by a causal connection; drivers
with poor safety records tend to have more accidents than do drivers
with good safety records.' 2 The incentive to improve driving habits will
be substantial, because drivers with good safety records will receive the
396. EQUITY AND ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 14-15. The only incentive is to move
from an urban area to rural and suburban areas. As the Massachusetts Division of Insurance
noted, that is a dubious incentive. Id.
397. See supra Part I.A.2.
398. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), supra note 8 and ac-
companying text.
399. STUDY OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE BY ZIP CODE (Phase I), supra note
2, at 41-47; King v. Meese, 745 P.2d 887, 906 (Cal. 1987) (Broussard, J., concurring).
400. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02 (a)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
401. The California Department of Insurance concluded that "past driving history would
appear to be one of the strongest of all predictors of future accident potential" STUDY OF
CALIFORNIA DRIVING PERFORMANCE (Phase II), supra note 156, at 213. Massachusetts In-
surance Commissioner James Stone stated that "[tihere is an obvious relationship between past
driving record and future loss expectancy." Rights and Remedies, supra note 286, at 525 (Ap-
pendix E, Opinion, Findings and Decision on 1978 Automobile Insurance Rates). The New
Jersey Department of Insurance also concluded that "[a]ccident and driver conviction records
bear a direct relation to actual driving behavior... explanatory power of merit rating com-
pares favorably with demographic and geographic variables." NEw JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
INSURANCE, HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS AND RELATED
METHODOLOGIES: FINAL DETERMINATION-MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, at 57-58
(1981) [hereinafter HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS].
402. The California Department of Insurance found that drivers with poor records have
many more accidents than do drivers who are free of convictions and accidents. The Depart-
ment thus concluded that "from an actuarial standpoint, these data would clearly support
charging bad record drivers higher premiums because the expected number of accident claims
of bad record drivers would be much higher." STUDY OF CALIFORNIA DRIVING PERFORM-
ANCE (Phase II), supra note 156, at 101. The SRI study noted that about 11% of drivers have
an accident likelihood at least twice as large as the average. CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER,
supra note 85, at 44.
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most favorable liability insurance rates.403 That incentive will be in-
creased because Proposition 103 also has a safe driver provision which
ensures an additional twenty percent discount for drivers with good
safety records.'
An individual insured's driving record is clearly controllable by the
insured's own actions, at least to the extent that his/her own care in
driving affects the number of accidents and moving violations incurred.
The characteristic has the advantage of being compatible with a
number of widely held social and legal values. It comports with the con-
stitutional imperative that burdens imposed should bear some relation-
ship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing." 5 Drivers whose rates
are increased because of carelessness in accumulating accidents or mov-
ing violations will understand the cause of their unfavorable treatment,
and know it is due to their own actions, as opposed to the accident of
their place of residence.
Finally, those drivers whose rates in the private market might be-
come prohibitive because of poor driving records will have an alternative
available: the assigned risk pool." 6 Indeed, the only fault with driving
safety record, under the Wortham criteria, is that the degree of separa-
tion for merit rating may be poor.' 7
The second rating factor approved by Proposition 103 is the number
of miles driven annually." This rating factor also fares well under Pro-
fessor Wortham's evaluation criteria. Annual mileage has a high degree
of statistical power as a loss predictor." 9 The characteristic has a
straightforward relationship to risk of loss, which is supported by a
causal explanation-the more miles you drive, the more likely it is that
403. EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 57; HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 401, at 57.
404. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(b) (West Supp. 1992).
405. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175. See supra note 8 and accom-
panying text.
406. California has an extensive assigned risk program for motorists. CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 11620-11627 (West Supp. 1992). Presently, because of the effects of redlining, many resi-
dents of minority communities must purchase their automobile insurance through the assigned
risk program, regardless of their driving record. King v. Meese, 745 P.2d 889, 907-08 (Brous-
sard, J., concurring).
407. CASEY, PEZIER & SPETZLER, supra note 85, at 45-46.
408. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
409. HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 401, at 54; EQ-
urry & ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 17; Abraham, supra note 102, at 412. Abraham notes
in his article that insurers do not like to use mileage, despite its high predictive value, because
of the difficulty in obtaining accurate information from insureds. Accord EQUITY & ACCU-
RACY, supra note 117, at 17; HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS, supra
note 401, at 56-57; O'Hare, Information Strategies as Regulatory Surrogates, in Social Regula-
tion: Strategies for Reform 221, 232 (E. Bardach & R. Kagan eds., 1982).
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you will have an accident, regardless of your skill and/or care as a mo-
torist.41 0 Use of this factor also provides an incentive for reduction in
losses, since you can cut your rates by reducing your mileage.*1 Mileage
can be controlled by the insured, with the possible exception of mileage
directly attributable to demands of employment. Like driving safety rec-
ord, the use of total miles driven is compatible with widely held social
values. It is consistent with the notion that burdens imposed should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Drivers
whose rates are high because they accumulate high mileage will know the
cause for their rates, and will also know that those rates are due to their
driving habits, not the accident of their place of residence.
Assigned risk coverage will be available to those assessed high rates
due to excessive mileage accumulations. Presumably, if the excess mile-
age is due to the demands of work, employees will be able to negotiate
partial payment of premiums, or increased mileage allowances, based on
the additional burdens imposed due to their employment.41 2
The third factor approved by Proposition 103 is years of driving
experience. 41 3 Evaluation of this rating factor under Professor Wor-
tham's criteria produces mixed results. The available evidence suggests
that driving experience has good predictive power. The Massachusetts
Division of Insurance conducted a study that concluded that the predic-
tive power of years of driving experience compared favorably with age, a
rating factor used by virtually all companies writing automobile insur-
ance (where permitted).414 The relationship of driving experience to risk
loss can be explained by a causal connection; as with any skill, drivers
make more errors when beginning to drive than at a later time.
41 1
On the negative side of the ledger, the variable is not totally control-
lable by the insured. The beginning of a driver's learning curve is usually
determined by the minimum age for obtaining a driver's license. 416 Be-
cause the variable cannot be controlled by the insured, it provides no
4117oincentive for reduction of losses.417 Like age,"' years of driving experi-
410. EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 17; HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 401, at 54.
411. HEARING ON AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS, supra note 401, at 56.
412. The author was unable to locate any discussion of the degree of separation provided
by the use of mileage as a rating factor.
413. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.02(a)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
414. EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 17-21.
415. Id.
416. The minimum age for obtaining a driver's license in California is 16. CAL. VEH.
CODE § 12507 (West Supp. 1992).
417. EQUITY & ACCURACY, supra note 117, at 12 (stating that gender classification does
not have any useful incentive value because it is beyond the control of the insured).
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ence is susceptible to the claim that it is incompatible with the notion
that burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.
Since drivers are not responsible for their level of experience, this factor
is not as desirable as mileage and driving safety record.419
3. A Proposal for the Insurance Commissioner
The Insurance Commissioner of California should not allow insur-
ance companies to set automobile insurance rates based on geographic
location. Any form of territorial rating will violate the constitutional im-
perative that burdens imposed by the law should have some relationship
to individual responsibility. 420 Territorial rating has no relationship to
individual responsibility.42 The practice discriminates against people of
color and the urban poor, with the anomalous result that those individu-
als least able to pay are assessed the highest rates for a product that the
state requires them to purchase.422 If the Insurance Commissioner al-
lows insurers to use territorial rating, he will place the imprimatur of the
state on a practice that has a demonstrably disparate impact on two sus-
pect classifications: people of color and the urban poor. While the main-
tenance of profitable insurance companies is a compelling state interest,
territorial classifications are not necessary to advance that interest.423
The Insurance Commissioner should limit insurers to rating classifi-
cations that impose burdens based on individual responsibility. The clas-
sifications specifically approved by Proposition 103424 properly balance
the insurers' need to group risks with this constitutional imperative. Re-
quiring insurers to use the Proposition 103 rating classifications in con-
junction with rating criteria that are not dependent upon territory
425 will
418. Id at 9.
419. No data is readily available on the degree of separation for this classification. While
driving experience does not fare as well as driving safety record and mileage under the Wor-
tham criteria, its performance is still superior to that of territorial rating. See supra notes 389-
99 and accompanying text.
420. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 18-105 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 361-88 and accompanying text.
424. Driving safety record, annual miles driven, and years of driving experience. CAL. INS.
CODE § 1861.02 (West Supp. 1992).
425. In December 1989 former Insurance Commissioner Roxani Gillespie issued proposed
regulations which specified 22 rating characteristics which she would have allowed to be used
in setting automobile liability insurance rates. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, ch. 5, Adopt Sub-
chapter 4.7 (proposed). To select these characteristics, Commissioner Gillespie appointed a
panel of three actuarial experts to determine relationship to risk of loss. I'd § 2632.1 (f) (pro-
posed regulations). Eight of the proposed rating factors satisfy, for the most part, the evalua-
tion criteria set out by Professor Wortham. The eight characteristics are: vehicle type, make
and model, cost of repair and replacement, design characteristics related to injury prevention
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allow insurers to construct a system of automobile insurance rating that
is "actuarially sound."426
Conclusion
Twelve years ago, Rose Bird, former Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court, observed that "[t]he law should be something more than
just the handmaiden of a special class; it must ultimately be the servant
of justice."42 7 The legislative and regulatory decisions that have allowed
insurers to engage in redlining for so many years are examples of the law
serving as the handmaiden of a very powerful special class-the insur-
ance industry.428
As a result, people of color and the urban poor, those least able to
pay, are consistently charged more for automobile liability insurance
than any other group in the State of California. Members of those two
suspect classifications have borne the brunt of the territorial rating sys-
tem. If territorial rating is to continue, it must receive the approval of the
Insurance Commissioner. Should the commissioner grant that approval,
his action would convert the redlining activities of private insurers into
state action for purposes of the equal protection clauses of the California
Constitution. The effect of that decision would, consequently, violate the
California Constitution.
and "damageability," vehicle characteristics (such as engine size, safety devices, and theft de-
terrent devices), vehicle performance capability, type of use of the vehicle (business, commer-
cial, farming or personal). Id. § 2632.6 (c)(proposed). The relationship of each of these
characteristics to risk of loss can be supported by a persuasive causal explanation. Each car-
ries the seeds for encouraging reduction in the number of losses. Vehicles which present extra
risks, in the form of extra power, higher repair costs, and/or lack of safety devices, will cost
more to insure. The additional cost should discourage some potential buyers from purchasing
those vehicles. All of these factors are in the control of the insured. Since he opts to purchase
a particular automobile, he can change his risk of loss and his rates by choosing a different
vehicle. For all of the above reasons, these factors are consistent with widely held social val-
ues, because they assess cost according to personal responsibility.
426. The Commissioner might decide to allow territorial rating in some form because the
result is more palatable politically. See supra notes 115-23. If the Commissioner does allow
the continuation of territorial rating, he should adopt territories that do not allow the kind of
racial and economic isolation present in the current system. Moving to a system that uses
much larger territories (i.e. urban, suburban, rural, or regional territories) will eliminate the
most egregious racial and economic aspects of territorial rating as it is currently practiced.
That will not, however, eliminate the racial impact of territorial rating. Moreover, a modified
system of territorial rating would not satisfy the constitutional objective of conforming bur-
dens to individual responsibility.
427. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1304 (Cal. 1978) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
428. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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By adopting a system of automobile insurance rating that assigns
rates based only on factors related to individual responsibility, the Cali-
fornia Insurance Commissioner would eliminate the discriminatory ra-
cial and economic effects of redlining. This solution would not adversely
affect the solvency of California insurers. Using the factors that have
been outlined in Part IV of this Article, insurers would be able to form
underwriting categories that are "actuarially sound."
The passage of Proposition 103 presents a unique opportunity to
make California insurance law a servant of justice. The Commissioner
should take advantage of that opportunity.

